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Context clues? The billionth Uni GoW debunk probably using gameplay, trying to claim that shaking 9 realms is not significantly affecting them, ignoring things, etcetera.
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DEATH BATTLE! Discussion Thread (All-time Death Battle Spoilers Alert)
- Thread starter TMaakkonen
- Start date
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Nice try.
Never said lore scaling was bad. SMT is reliant on lore. It's 100% multiversal, but it doesn't have galaxy on screen feats. If SMT's lore was removed it would die to Goku. I also freely admit that this is an arbitrary rule and under strict fiction-as-documentary SMT isn't multiversal, along with other things (i.e: unquantifable DB, etc)
Doesn't determine truth. You're confusing social rules with actual truth. VSBW can do whatever it wants in regards to policies. The weight of an argument depends solely on its validity and soundness and precisely...nothing else.
Consensus doesn't determine truth. Differing opinions is not a sign there are many truths.
Already wrong, but whatever.
Good. I disagree with all of TIer 2, Tier 1. I also think illogical verses like AWLBA should just be tossed out and banned from the wiki due to being illogical. I can defend each of these points with mathematics and logic to such a degree that trying to argue against them essentially requires you to commit a logical contradiction; which means my position is effectively impossible to argue against. This isn't surprising considering this very site admits that their tiering system is flawed (which in of itself destroys their abilities to make truth claims in regards to those rules. Under Tier 2's own rules 2-B and 2-C are the same tier and only by fiat are they different tiers).
Incoherent postmodernist slop. I already tackled the subjective/objective distinction in the Tour De Force. To sum it up: there's an objective core (the text) and an objective framework (the rules to analyze said text under the framework of powerscaling, which by necessity of making truth claims is subject to the laws of argumentation and truth claims), but the underlying basis for the rules is subjective, much like although the decisions within the rules of chess are objective, the rules themselves are subjective and don't determine anything.
Nowhere do consensus, tradition, etc, enter the argument.
Here's a translated version. Here's another one.
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Imma be honest, sounds like a lot of buzzwords to me
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See the second last thing.
TBF I'm one of the people who actually buys Multiversal Goku, and I don't even like DB so I don't know what the people who argue him to be like Planet level max are on
Yes indeedy, and in fact that's not even what happens here, it's a select group who can even yay or nay something, and you won't find a user here who hasn't vehemently disagreed with something a staff member has said
So are you. Wonderful thing about scaling, huh?
...My dude. Asura is a cyborg who runs on a fictional resource who punches out people the size of planets and galaxies. Nothing about his story is logical in the purest sense.
Also I'd only keep tier 2, but make it tier 1, and keep tier 0, but that's because tier 2/1 would be one tier just labeled "Multiversal"
Holy Word salad, just say "I scale lower than you do" and agree to disagree. Most of this is the equivalent of closing your eyes, plugging your ears, and saying "My way is the only way". Be more open-minded than that, yeah?
Going over these with a bit of a skim over things and the same kind of skim of the actual blogs that has Uni and up GoW accepted... Yep, I think I'll stand by my 9 Universe scaling, thanks. Also 99% sure I've seen this exact blog before.
If you don't like it make a CRT.Your next words are 'if you don't like it make a CRT'
You missed proper punctuation and capitalization I try to always use... also--
D'oh!
Kellex
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That ai translation is, uh, truly something lol.
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I know right? I had to decipher what the ****-**** it was even saying like a Skaven trying to decipher Lizardmen tablets.
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Refuted by the document. Try harder.
Goku isn't above 3-A because he has a 50x multiplier transformation that works. Infinity x 50 = infinity (same amount), but Goku gets stronger, meaning he's finite. Also do not in any case hit me with the muh illogic argument. I've refuted it.
Unironically commited a logical fallacy award
Also this is straight up incoherent with the entire notion of CRTs. CRTs are started by people who think the consensus is wrong. If the consensus is right then there's no reason to start a CRT. Consensus theory is an extremely poor theory of truth. See the spoiler below.
Section 2: What Truth Is and Why the Other Theories Fail
2.1 The Correspondence Theory
Truth is correspondence to reality. A statement is true if and only if it accurately describes the world as it actually is. This is the correspondence theory of truth, and it is the foundation that makes evidence matter at all.In powerscaling, "Goku has infinite speed" is true if and only if, in the fictional reality of Dragon Ball as constituted by the text, Goku actually possesses infinite speed. Not if it is useful to believe this. Not if it coheres with other beliefs. Not if the community agrees. If and only if the text actually depicts or entails this.
Correspondence has three irreplaceable virtues. First, objectivity: a claim can be true even if everyone believes it false, and false even if everyone believes it true. Truth is independent of belief. Second, determinacy: for any proposition, there is a fact of the matter about whether it corresponds to reality. There is no "true for me but not for you." Third, it explains why evidence matters: evidence is relevant because it indicates whether a proposition actually corresponds to reality. Without correspondence, evidence has no role — it would be relevant to usefulness or coherence, which are different questions.
Sourced claim: The correspondence theory of truth is the standard framework for objective factual claims. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV; Russell, B. The Problems of Philosophy, 1912; Armstrong, D.M. Truth and Truthmakers, Cambridge University Press, 2004; David, M. "The Correspondence Theory of Truth," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2022.)
Opposite claim: The correspondence theory is philosophically untenable because we have no unmediated access to reality. We can only compare beliefs to other beliefs, never beliefs to raw reality. Correspondence is therefore an empty ideal that cannot do any epistemological work.
Steelman: This is the serious epistemological coherentist position, associated with Neurath, Quine, and Davidson. The argument runs: to check whether a belief corresponds to reality, you need access to reality as it is independent of your beliefs. But every act of checking is itself a cognitive act mediated by your existing beliefs, concepts, and perceptual systems. You never get outside the web of belief to compare it against bare reality. Therefore "correspondence to reality" cannot serve as a criterion of truth you can actually apply — it is a regulative ideal at best, not a working standard. Davidson's version adds that the very concept of truth requires only that we be able to use the word "true" correctly in practice, which requires nothing like a correspondence relation to mind-independent reality.
Why the steelman fails in this context: The epistemological objection is real in its proper domain — it is a genuine problem for naive versions of the correspondence theory in general epistemology. But in the specific context of claims about fictional texts, it has no force, because the "reality" to which fictional claims must correspond is the text itself, which is directly accessible. There is no epistemic gap between you and the text analogous to the gap between you and mind-independent physical reality. You can read it. The words are there. "Goku destroyed the planet" either appears in and is supported by the text or it is not. The deep epistemological problem of accessing mind-independent reality does not arise when the relevant reality is a publicly available document. This means the correspondence theory works in precisely the domain where we need it: claims about fictional texts are objectively true or false depending on what the text contains and entails, and this is checkable without philosophical complications about epistemic access to reality.
2.2 Why Alternative Theories Fail
The Coherence Theory holds that a statement is true if it coheres harmoniously with a comprehensive system of beliefs. This fails for three decisive reasons.First, multiple internally coherent but mutually incompatible systems can exist simultaneously. A coherent scaling system placing Thor at wall-level is constructible. So is one placing him at outerversal. Coherence alone cannot adjudicate between them, because both are internally consistent. Truth requires more than internal consistency.
Second, coherence is a property of belief systems, not a definition of truth. A belief system can be fully coherent and still be entirely disconnected from the text it purports to describe. Internal harmony among false beliefs is still false.
Third, coherence makes error inexplicable. If truth is coherence, any coherent set of beliefs is true by definition. But people hold coherent false beliefs constantly. The history of science consists largely of overthrowing coherent but false theories.
Sourced claim: The coherence theory fails to provide a sufficient condition for truth. (Bradley, F.H. Essays on Truth and Reality, 1914; Blanshard, B. The Nature of Thought, 1939, for the coherentist position; Walker, R.C.S. The Coherence Theory of Truth, Routledge, 1989 for criticism.)
Opposite claim: The coherence theory is the right framework for fictional worlds precisely because fictional worlds are constituted by coherent narrative systems, not by correspondence to any external reality. A fictional claim is true when it fits coherently within the narrative.
Steelman: This is actually a sophisticated and defensible position for fiction specifically. Nelson Goodman's work on "worldmaking" and the idea that fictional worlds are constructed rather than discovered suggests that coherence might be exactly the right criterion for fictional truth. If there is no mind-independent fictional reality to correspond to, then what makes a fictional claim true is its fit within the narrative system the fiction constructs. This is not obviously wrong. It has serious defenders in the philosophy of fiction (Walton, Lewis, Lamarque and Olsen).
Why the steelman fails: Even granting that fictional truth is partly constituted by narrative coherence, this does not help the powerscaler for two reasons. First, it makes high-end scaling harder, not easier: if fictional truth is coherence within the narrative, then claims about omnipotence or infinite speed must cohere with every other fact in the narrative — including anti-feats, inconsistencies, and moments where the supposedly infinite-speed character is clearly depicted moving at finite speeds. A coherentist fictional truth standard would demand maximum internal consistency, which is precisely what high-end scaling routinely violates. Second, the coherentist standard for fiction cannot support cross-verse comparison, because different fictions constitute different coherent systems. There is no coherence relation between the Dragon Ball system and the Marvel system — they are separate and mutually incommensurable narrative worlds. Cross-verse comparison, which is the primary activity of powerscaling, has no coherentist foundation whatsoever.
The Pragmatic Theory holds that truth is what works — what proves useful in practice. William James: "truth is the expedient in the way of our thinking." This fails because usefulness and truth diverge systematically. Beliefs can be useful without being true (placebo effect, lucky beliefs, comforting falsehoods). Beliefs can be true without being useful (most mathematical truths have no practical application). The pragmatic theory would make every scaler's preferred interpretation correct for them, since believing in a powerful character is useful for enjoyment and community standing. That is not analysis. It is preference validation.
Sourced claim: The pragmatic theory conflates truth with utility. (James, W. Pragmatism, 1907 for the pragmatist position; Russell, B. "William James's Conception of Truth," in Philosophical Essays, 1910 for criticism; Misak, C. The American Pragmatists, Oxford University Press, 2013.)
Opposite claim: Pragmatism is the right framework for powerscaling because powerscaling is explicitly a practice oriented toward community utility — having productive debates, establishing relative power for the purposes of fictional matchups — and not toward discovering objective facts about fictional worlds.
Steelman: This is a coherent redescription of what powerscaling is actually for. If the goal is to have interesting debates and productive community discussions rather than to discover objective truth, then "what works for the practice" might be the right evaluative standard. Rorty's neo-pragmatism supports this: truth talk is just a way of commending beliefs that have proved useful within a practice, and there is no further fact called "objective truth" that we are tracking when we use the word "true."
Why the steelman fails: It concedes the entire argument. If powerscaling is not aimed at objective truth, then powerscaling claims are not objective truth-claims, and no one has established anything about any character's actual power level. Every "conclusion" is just a useful fiction within the practice. This means that when a scaler says "Goku is infinite speed," they are not saying anything that is actually true — they are producing a useful conversational move. But scalers routinely treat their conclusions as objectively correct. They accuse opponents of being wrong, not merely of playing the game differently. They appeal to evidence as if evidence tracks truth, not usefulness. The pragmatist redescription makes the entire practice incoherent on its own terms. Furthermore, Rorty's anti-realism is one of the most contested positions in contemporary philosophy — it cannot be invoked as though it settles the question.
The Deflationary Theory holds that "it is true that P" means nothing more than P. Truth is not a substantive property. This is technically interesting and practically useless. It tells you that "it is true that Goku has infinite speed" means the same as "Goku has infinite speed," which is correct but gives zero guidance for determining whether either statement is actually correct. Deflationism is a theory about the logical behavior of the truth predicate, not a theory of how to evaluate claims.
Sourced claim: Deflationary theories of truth deflate the concept but leave the epistemological question of how to evaluate claims untouched. (Ramsey, F.P. "Facts and Propositions," 1927; Quine, W.V.O. Philosophy of Logic, 1970; Horwich, P. Truth, Blackwell, 1998; for criticism, see Wright, C. Truth and Objectivity, Harvard University Press, 1992.)
The Consensus Theory holds that truth is what a community agrees on. This fails because consensus and truth diverge constantly. Scientific communities have agreed on false theories throughout history — phlogiston, caloric, the luminiferous ether. Powerscaling communities regularly reach consensus on interpretations that closer examination shows to be textually unsupported. Consensus is a social fact. Truth is not a social fact. The two are independent.
Sourced claim: Consensus does not constitute truth. (Pettit, P. "The Reality of Rule-Following," Mind, 1990; Longino, H. Science as Social Knowledge, Princeton University Press, 1990 for social epistemology; Boghossian, P. Fear of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 2006 for criticism of consensus theories.)
Opposite claim: In the absence of any external reality to appeal to for fictional claims, community consensus is the only available standard. We have nothing else to check against.
Steelman: This is the most practically compelling argument for consensus. If fictional worlds are not real, there is no external checker. The text is subject to interpretation, and interpretations differ. In the absence of a definitive arbiter, the community's settled agreement functions as the best available approximation of what the text means. This is how many interpretive communities — legal, literary, religious — actually operate. Originalism in constitutional law is precisely a debate about how to constrain interpretation in the absence of direct access to original intent.
Why the steelman fails: The text is the external checker. Consensus theories work only when there genuinely is no external reality to appeal to. In the case of fictional claims, the text is directly accessible, its words have public meanings, and the inferential chains from text to interpretation are evaluable by logical standards. The text is not infinitely plastic — it actually says specific things. A consensus that "Goku has infinite speed" that is contradicted by the text depicting Goku taking time to move is simply a false consensus, not a valid one. The text provides exactly the kind of external constraint that makes consensus unnecessary as a truth standard.
No. I am right. I provided evidence for my position which refutes the VS wiki position of above continental Kratos. I also debunked Tiers 2 and 1. Universal Kratos is fanfiction, Multiversal Kratos is illogical fanfiction. That fanfic Kratos is a principle of explosion victim.
You do not understand what logic is.
Fiction Can Make Its Own Logic Tho
Okay, let’s examine the ‘’’best’’’ counter to all of this. ‘It’s fiction! Fiction doesn’t have to abide by logic!’
This counter fails on three levels.
It fails because logic is a tool we use to understand reality. We understand everything through the three laws of thought. We analyze fiction created by an author—sorry I mean appears from nowhere—through this. We understand the sentence ‘The dragon was killed’ using logic and logic operators. Dismissing logic dismisses the only tool we use to understand anything.
It fails because fiction is a construct of the human mi—errr I mean it’s just something that appears from nowhere! Anyway DESPITE APPEARING FROM NOWHERE LIKE IT WAS CREATED BY SOME WEIRD GOD HA HA it can be entirely understood through human thought. This is because any fiction cannot exist on any more level than text and visuals (as explained before: there is no fictional lower layer whatsoever). A thing made from the human mind is bound to the limits of the human mind.
It fails because logical contradictions hold no useful information. Okay, let’s say you’re a dialetheist and want to allow for contradictions. No biggy, no biggy. Anyway, you write this sentence: ‘The door was both open and closed in the same way at the same time’. Okay so what does that mean? Can you visualize this door? No. Can you imagine someone walking through it? No. If someone asks ‘Can I walk through this door’ can you answer? No.
Also, dialetheism has more mistakes than you want in powerscaling. You can’t use proof via contradiction (contradictions can be true) and you can’t falsify things (contradictions can be true). You don’t have a good way for why explosion occurs with some contradictions but not others. You can’t use Modus Tollens, Disjunctive Syllogism, Excluded Middle Arguments, or arguments based off of Consistency Requirements,
Let’s say you use intuitionistic logic. Seems good, right? This is a specific field of logic for a very narrow field and is not meant to be ontic. Fiction is not built off of proof. Ever. Even the no author view has to admit that fiction is a series of declarative statements that are unchallenged if not actively contradicted.
But what if you shift from “fiction doesn’t need logic” to “fiction can make its own logic”? Seems good, right? No. Let's dismantle this idea by examining what "logic" means and the consequences of a fiction attempting to declare its own.
The claim is false because it confuses rules with logic. A fiction can absolutely declare its own rules, its own physics, its own axioms. It can say "in this world, people can fly by thinking happy thoughts" or "this energy source, called Midichlorians, grants psychic powers." These are contingent facts about that universe. But logic is the operating system that allows those rules to be understood and to cohere into a world in the first place. Physics is not logic because the former is a set of contingent laws. One could in theory build a world where the laws of physics are different. See orthogonal.
Logic is not a set of facts within the world; it is the framework for a world. It is the law of identity (A is A), non-contradiction (not both A and not-A), and excluded middle (either A or not-A). For a fiction to "create its own logic," it would have to somehow redefine these fundamental principles of thought and meaning. This is impossible because the medium of fiction—language and narrative—is built upon them.
Let's say a story attempts this. It declares: "In this narrative, the Law of Non-Contradiction is suspended." The immediate consequence is that the story loses the ability to convey any reliable information. Consider a single sentence born from this new "logic":
The Text: "The invincible knight was slain by the peasant."
Under standard logic, this is a contradiction if "invincible" means "cannot be slain." We are forced to reconcile it: perhaps "invincible" was hyperbolic, perhaps the peasant had a special weapon, perhaps the knight wasn't truly invincible. The narrative creates a puzzle to be solved, guiding us to a deeper understanding of the world's rules.
Under the fiction's "own logic," where contradiction is permitted, the sentence is just a string of words. "Invincible" does not preclude "slain." There is no puzzle. There is no new information. The words "invincible" and "slain" are stripped of their meanings because their definitions, which rely on not being their opposites, are no longer stable. The statement becomes a content-free paradox, a narrative dead end. It doesn't expand the world; it collapses it into nonsense.
This is why you cannot use proof by contradiction. Your proof would go:
- Assume the knight is invincible.
- The text states the knight was slain.
- This contradicts our assumption.
- Therefore, the knight is not invincible.
But if the fiction has its own logic where contradiction is valid, then step 3 has no force. The contradiction does not falsify the assumption. The knight can be both invincible and slain. Your proof fails. Any attempt to reason about the story—to deduce a character's capabilities, to understand the plot, to even follow the sequence of events—becomes impossible. Analysis is replaced with arbitrary, groundless assertion.
The powerscaler who invokes this wants to have it both ways. They want to use classical logic's rigorous, linear reasoning to build immense power scaling chains from feats and statements. But the moment that same rigorous logic leads to a contradiction that caps their character's power (like a "multiversal" character being harmed by a planet), they want to jump to their "own logic" where that contradiction is perfectly fine and doesn't invalidate the high-end feat.
You cannot use a system of reasoning to prove a point and then, when that system threatens your conclusion, declare the system optional. The very act of arguing for a "own logic" interpretation is a logical argument that presupposes the validity of logic to be understood.
In the end, a fiction's "own logic" is a phantom. A fiction can be illogical, but it cannot be a-logical or possess a different logic without ceasing to be a communicable narrative. It can be a dream, a hallucination, a stream of consciousness—but it cannot be analyzed for "power levels" because analysis itself is a logical process. The moment a powerscaler tries to scale a character, they have already, necessarily, submitted to the standard laws of thought. To then deny them in the same breath is to saw off the branch they are sitting on, all to avoid the simple, logical conclusion that their favorite character is not as powerful as they desperately need them to be.
The last thing to say is that anyone who has ever tried to imply that something in a fiction is not true because it would create contradictions to have it be true is in strict violation of this ‘fiction has no logic’ argument. Under ‘fiction has no logic’, then no anti-feat can ever exist, no amount of evidence can ever rule out any interpretation, because fiction says something and it is true, regardless of how ‘logical’ it is.
Technically this means characters can win any battle they can’t win and lose any battle they can’t lose because to say that a character can’t win a battle they can’t win is to assume contradictions can’t be true, which you already outrule if you’re doing ‘beyond logic’ stuff already.
See: https://iep.utm.edu/para-log/, https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/in-contradiction-a-study-of-the-transconsistent/, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-30221-4_2, https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/the-law-of-non-contradiction-new-philosophical-essays/, https://alioshabielenberg.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Dialetheism.pdf,
Universal Definitions
Powerscaling relies on universal definitions—a term must mean the same across all (or close to all) fictions. This is because cross-verse debate is essentially a conversation. Just as one cannot converse with a person that speaks another language, you cannot engage in cross-verse debate with a series that defines everything differently. Calcs are based on a universal definition of physical speed and durability and power. If you remove this, you have no basis for explaining why Superman would be universal in Saint Seiya, if he is universal in DC.
If this is violated, powerscaling dies, as detailed above. If each fiction can make its own definition for things, then no conversation is possible.
This also serves as a counter to the idea that DC, Marvel, or Dragon Ball can declare whatever form of infinity or abstraction they like and have it taken at face value. "If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, swims like a duck, it is a duck." If a verse defines infinity as just a very large number, then it is just a very large finite number—inferior to real infinity. If a verse defines "abstract" as just a fancy physical thing, then it is physical. The consequences must be literal for the properties to be literal. If a bachelor is not clearly unmarried, he is only a bachelor in a figurative sense—not a literal one.
Words have public meanings. This follows from the most defensible account of how meaning works.
The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations, developed what are called the rule-following considerations. The core insight is this: meaning is not something a private mind stipulates and then exports into language. Meaning is constituted by public, communal practice—by how words are actually used within a linguistic community over time. There is no such thing as a purely private definition that carries normative force. If you decide, alone, that the word "red" means what everyone else calls "blue," you haven't created a new meaning. You've just started using a word incorrectly.
This applies directly to authors. An author does not own the words they use. The moment a text is written to be read, interpretation is governed by the shared linguistic norms of the community reading it—not by authorial intent alone. When a Dragon Ball writer uses the word "infinite," they are borrowing a word whose meaning is already fixed by the mathematical and everyday linguistic community. They can gesture at infinity, use it metaphorically, invoke it dramatically. What they cannot do is silently redefine it to mean something incompatible with its established meaning and expect that redefinition to carry force in an external analysis. The reader brings public meaning to the text whether the author intended it or not.
There is a further point specific to powerscaling. When a calc measures a character's speed, it uses our physics, our units, our definitions of distance and time. The fiction doesn't supply these—we import them from the outside. One might ask: why should calcs use external frameworks at all? Isn't that just assuming the conclusion? The answer is that the alternative is no cross-verse comparison at all. If every verse supplies its own definitions and those definitions are authoritative, then Superman's "universal" and Goku's "universal" are incommensurable—they cannot be compared because they are measured in different and mutually untranslatable units. Cross-verse debate becomes impossible by construction. The external framework isn't assumed arbitrarily; it is the only neutral ground that makes the entire enterprise coherent. A verse's internal redefinitions are therefore inert from the perspective of the calc not because we decree it, but because the calc was never drawing on the fiction's internal definitions to begin with—and if it were, no cross-verse calc could ever be run.
Objection 1: Genre Convention as Community Meaning
The strongest objection here is actually Wittgensteinian in form. It goes like this: within the community of shounen manga readers, terms like "universe-busting" or "infinite speed" have a recognized, roughly shared meaning established through genre convention. Isn't that exactly the kind of communal linguistic practice Wittgenstein endorses? If the community of readers and scalers uses "universe-level" to mean a specific tier of power, doesn't that constitute a valid public meaning that external definitions can't simply override?This is a genuine objection and deserves a direct answer.
First, genre convention establishes a ceiling of interpretation, not a foundation for literal physical claims. When the shounen community uses "universe-busting," the shared understanding is roughly "inconceivably, cosmically powerful"—a dramatic register, not a precise physical measurement. The moment a scaler tries to cash that out as a literal claim about the character's capacity to destroy all spacetime in a cross-verse physical confrontation, they have left the community meaning behind. They are now making a physics claim using a term that the community never defined with that precision. The genre convention licenses the dramatic reading. It does not license the literal one.
Second, the genre community's meaning and the scaler's meaning are often not the same thing, even though scalers assume they are. Ask a casual reader of Dragon Ball what "infinite ki" means and they will tell you it means Goku is unimaginably powerful. Ask a powerscaler and they will tell you it means Goku's energy is literally mathematically infinite and therefore transcends any finite quantity. These are different claims. The scaler is not recovering the community meaning—they are smuggling in a precise technical interpretation under cover of the genre convention. Wittgenstein's point was that meaning is public practice, not that any sufficiently enthusiastic subculture can redefine technical terms for their own purposes and demand external recognition.
Third, even granting that a genre community can establish its own meanings, this only helps with intra-verse or intra-genre comparisons. The entire problem of cross-verse debate is that you are comparing characters from communities with different conventions. Superman's "universe-level" and Goku's "universe-level" may mean different things within their respective genre communities. The only neutral ground available for comparison is the shared external framework—standard physics, standard mathematics, standard logic. Retreating to genre convention doesn't solve the cross-verse problem; it dissolves it, by making comparison impossible in exactly the way this section has been arguing it would be.
Objection 2: Authors Can Establish Meaning Through Consistent Use
A second objection: even granting Wittgenstein's point that private stipulation doesn't fix meaning, an author who consistently uses a term in a specific way across a long work is doing something more than private stipulation. They are establishing a pattern of use. Doesn't consistent use within a text create its own local meaning that readers learn to recognize?Yes—and this is freely granted. An author absolutely can establish local meaning through consistent use. If a fiction consistently uses "speed" to refer to a non-physical property of plot relevance, and readers come to understand it that way, then within that fiction "speed" carries that local meaning. This is uncontroversial.
But notice what this grants and what it doesn't. It grants that fictions can have internal consistency. It does not grant that those internal definitions transfer into cross-verse analysis. When you take a character out of their fiction and compare them to a character from another fiction, you are necessarily operating outside both fictions' local meaning systems. You need a third framework. That framework is the shared external one. Local meanings become inert the moment you step outside the text, for exactly the same reason that knowing the rules of chess doesn't help you when someone asks you to play Go. Consistent local use, even genuine consistent local use, cannot resolve cross-verse disputes because it is precisely what those disputes are about—which local system's terms should govern. You cannot answer that question by appealing to one of the local systems. You need neutral ground, and the only neutral ground available is the shared external framework.
Furthermore, the scalers who invoke this objection are usually not actually pointing to consistent authorial use. They are pointing to a single statement, a single panel, a single line of dialogue, and treating it as a definitional declaration. Consistent use is a real phenomenon. Cherry-picked statements are not consistent use—they are outliers being treated as axioms, which is a separate problem but worth naming.
Objection 3: Authorial Intent Should Govern Interpretation
A third objection, less philosophical but common in practice: surely the author knows what they meant, and their intent should govern how we read their work. If the author says a character is "truly infinite," who are we to say they meant something lesser?This conflates two separate questions: what the author intended to convey, and whether what they intended to convey is coherent and meaningful. An author can intend to describe a truly infinite being. That intention doesn't automatically make the description coherent, any more than intending to draw a round square makes the drawing possible. The author has authority over their intentions. They do not have authority over whether those intentions successfully produce coherent content in the reader.
More practically: authorial intent is notoriously difficult to establish in fiction, especially in long-running collaborative properties like superhero comics or ongoing manga where dozens of writers contribute over decades. Appealing to authorial intent in these cases is almost always a selective appeal—picking the writer whose statement supports your scaling while ignoring the twenty contradicting statements from other writers. Intent, in this context, is not a stable foundation. Public meaning, by contrast, is stable precisely because it doesn't depend on recovering any particular person's private mental state.
Objection 4: Fictional Statements as Performative Declarations
A fourth objection draws on speech act theory. When a narrator declares "this character is truly omnipotent," perhaps that statement isn't functioning as a description at all—descriptions can be accurate or inaccurate against some external standard—but as a performative declaration, like a judge pronouncing a verdict or a priest pronouncing a marriage. Performative statements don't describe a pre-existing state of affairs; they constitute one by being uttered. Under this view, the narrator saying "omnipotent" doesn't attempt to describe the character's power level against some external scale; it creates the character's power level as a fact within the fiction. There is no gap between intent and reality because the declaration just is the reality.This is actually a more sophisticated position than most scalers consciously hold, but it underlies a lot of instinctive resistance to external definitions—the feeling that the text just says the character is omnipotent and that should settle it.
The response is that performative force is domain-limited. When a judge pronounces a verdict, the performative force of that declaration operates within a specific institutional framework—the legal system—that gives those words their constitutive power. Outside that framework, the words are just words. "I pronounce you guilty" said by a random person on the street constitutes nothing. Similarly, a narrator's declaration of omnipotence has performative force within the fiction—it constitutes a fact about that fictional world. But cross-verse comparison is by definition an operation conducted outside any single fiction. You have stepped outside the institutional framework that gave the declaration its force. The narrator's "omnipotent" can constitute a fact within the story. It cannot constitute a fact about how that character performs against an external measuring stick the story never had jurisdiction over, any more than a British court's verdict has automatic legal force in Japan. The declaration makes something true inside. It has no reach outside.
If we grant this…
If we grant the impossible worlds framework, how would it work? First, you already know that powerscaling only works under the premise that fiction is some sort of portal to another world out there—this is called fictional realism. This entire section operates within that assumption: if you reject fictional realism entirely, the possible/impossible worlds framing doesn't arise in the first place. Under usual powerscaling, this fiction is held to be a logically possible world that is determinate: every feature that would logically follow from its laws exists, even if the fiction itself doesn't detail it. But if we want to allow for beyond-logic statements, we can expand on the possible world methodology and say that they are impossible worlds, which contain logical contradictions.So we use dialetheism to avoid explosion. What does this actually get us?
Take Ultraman's Greeza—described as both existing and not existing at the same time, a paradox. Under possible world powerscaling, this is incoherent and must be dismissed or reconciled. Under impossible world powerscaling, this is a true contradiction, and the author appears to be more faithfully represented. This seems like a win for the impossible worlds advocate.
But it isn't. Here's why.
The Comprehension Problem: All Cost, No Benefit
Before examining why impossible worlds fails on its own terms, it's worth establishing that it doesn't even succeed on its stated purpose—faithfully representing paradoxical fictional statements in a way that produces useful scaling output.
Take Greeza again. Even granting that his paradoxical existence is a true contradiction, this tells us nothing useful about what that contradiction means in cross-verse terms. A being that both exists and does not exist in the same sense at the same time still resists any coherent visualization or application. In practice, both possible and impossible world powerscaling end up doing the same thing with statements like this: ignoring the metaphysical claim and extracting only the practical effect—Greeza cannot be harmed by normal attacks. Both frameworks arrive at the same destination. The impossible worlds framework produces no additional scaling output whatsoever.
This matters because the frameworks are not otherwise equivalent. Impossible worlds carries enormous philosophical costs—costs detailed in the following sections. If you are paying those costs and receiving nothing in return, the framework is not a tool. It is pure liability. The scaler who adopts impossible worlds to better represent paradoxical fiction has made a trade: they have surrendered coherent debate in exchange for a metaphysical label that changes nothing about their practical conclusions. That is not a good trade. And it gets worse from here.
The Explosion Containment Problem
The fundamental issue with importing dialetheism into powerscaling is that dialetheism is not a free pass to accept whichever contradictions you like. Academic dialetheists—the philosophers who actually defend true contradictions—work extremely hard to contain explosion. Explosion is the classical logical principle that from a contradiction, anything follows: if both P and not-P are true, then every statement is true, and your logical system collapses into noise. Dialetheists don't simply accept this. They develop careful, technically demanding logical machinery—paraconsistent logics, restricted inference rules, principled accounts of which statements are truth-value gluts and which aren't—specifically to prevent one true contradiction from making everything true.
The scaler who invokes impossible worlds has none of this machinery. What they have, in practice, is a decision procedure that looks like this: contradictions that support my scaling are true; contradictions that threaten my scaling are not. Greeza's paradoxical existence is a true contradiction because it inflates his power level. Krillin failing to break a metal door is not a true contradiction with his planet-busting feats because accepting it as one would deflate his power level. This isn't dialetheism. It's motivated reasoning with philosophical vocabulary stapled to it.
A sophisticated opponent might respond: fine, we'll adopt a paraconsistent logic properly—LP, or a similar system—and use its machinery to contain explosion in a principled way. Now we have a real framework. Does this work?
No, and for a decisive reason. Paraconsistent logics contain explosion by weakening inference rules. Specifically, they restrict moves like disjunctive syllogism—the inference from "A or B" and "not-A" to "B"—and similar classical principles. But these are precisely the inference rules that powerscaling depends on. Every scaling chain is a sequence of inferences: this character survived this feat, therefore they have at least this durability, therefore they can withstand this other attack, therefore they scale above this other character. These inferences rely on the classical logical moves that paraconsistent logic restricts. Adopting LP to contain explosion doesn't save the scaling methodology—it amputates it. The cure is as fatal as the disease. You have traded explosion, which makes everything true, for weakened inference, which makes your conclusions unreachable. Either way, the scaling chain doesn't go through.
The impossible worlds framework therefore requires principled explosion containment that powerscaling can never provide without simultaneously destroying the inferential structure scaling depends on.
The Self-Destruction Problem
The deepest problem is that impossible worlds powerscaling destroys the practice it was invoked to protect.
Powerscaling is entirely built on arguments. You assert that a character has a certain power level, your opponent challenges it, you defend it with evidence and reasoning, they counter with anti-feats and inconsistencies. Every single step of this process relies on classical logic. You are saying: given these feats, it follows that this character has this capability. Given this capability, it follows they can or cannot beat this other character. "It follows" is a logical relation. It presupposes that contradictions are not simultaneously true, that modus ponens works, that you can falsify a claim by showing it leads to a contradiction.
Under impossible worlds with genuine dialetheism—and as shown above, any paraconsistent system rigorous enough to contain explosion also weakens the inferences scaling needs—none of this works cleanly. You cannot argue that a character cannot beat another character, because under dialetheism the contradiction of that claim is simultaneously true. You cannot use an anti-feat to cap a power level, because it is simultaneously true that the anti-feat applies and that it doesn't. You cannot assert that a character scales to their own feats, because it is simultaneously true that they do and that they don't.
The scaler who adopts impossible worlds to protect a high-end feat from logical attack has not found a shield. They have burned down the arena. Every argument they make for their character is, under their own framework, simultaneously false. Every conclusion they reach is simultaneously not reached. The framework does not give them a powerful character. It gives them a character about whom nothing coherent can be said—which is not a victory condition in a debate.
The impossible worlds move, applied honestly, is not a tool for powerscaling. It is the end of powerscaling. The only reason it appears useful is that no one applying it actually applies it honestly. They apply it selectively, which as shown above requires an explosion containment mechanism they do not have—and any rigorous containment mechanism they could adopt destroys the scaling methodology anyway. The impossible worlds advocate is caught in a trilemma: apply the framework naively and explode into noise, apply it with paraconsistent containment and lose the inference rules scaling depends on, or apply it selectively and admit the selection is unprincipled. None of these is a viable path. The framework does not give you what you want.
The Steelman
The strongest version of this position goes something like this:
Logic is a feature of human cognition, not a feature of reality itself. We have no guarantee that the laws of thought are ontologically fundamental—they may simply be the shape of human minds imposed onto a universe that has no obligation to respect them. Quantum mechanics already gives us phenomena that violate classical intuitions: superposition, entanglement, the apparent breakdown of classical determinism at the quantum level. If physical reality can be stranger than classical logic permits, why should fictional reality—which is explicitly not bound by physical reality—be any more constrained? A fiction that declares true contradictions isn't failing at communication. It's gesturing at a mode of existence that human language, built for navigating a macroscopic classical world, is simply too coarse to capture. The paradox isn't a bug. It's the point. The author is communicating precisely that this entity or phenomenon exceeds the expressive capacity of logic itself.
This is a coherent and interesting philosophical position. It deserves a real answer rather than dismissal.
The Quantum Mechanics Appeal Fails
Before reaching the conclusions, the steelman's most attractive move needs to be addressed directly, because it does the most work in making the position seem scientifically respectable.
Quantum mechanical phenomena do not actually violate the law of non-contradiction. Superposition is not a true contradiction. A particle in superposition is not both spin-up and spin-down in the same sense at the same time—it is in an indefinite state that resolves upon measurement. The excluded middle appears to break down in quantum contexts not because contradictions become true, but because some propositions become neither true nor false prior to measurement. This is intuitionism or three-valued logic, not dialetheism. These are fundamentally different frameworks. Dialetheism says some propositions are both true and false. Intuitionism says some propositions are neither. The steelman needs the former. Quantum mechanics, at most, suggests the latter.
This matters because indeterminacy doesn't help the scaler at all. An indeterminate power level is not a high power level. If quantum logic is the correct analogy, then paradoxical fictional statements don't become true contradictions—they become statements with no determinate truth value. "This character is omnipotent" is neither true nor false. That is not a useful result for someone trying to establish that their character is omnipotent. The quantum appeal, followed honestly, leads to the conclusion that paradoxical power level claims are simply indeterminate—which means they cannot be used to establish anything.
The steelman therefore loses its most scientifically grounded support before the main argument even begins.
Where It Leads
Now follow the position honestly to its conclusions.
Conclusion 1: No power level claim can be established as decisively true.
The steelman's appeal requires that contradictions can be true within the fiction. But dialetheism—the philosophical framework that actually defends true contradictions—does not hold that all statements and their negations are simultaneously true. That would be explosion, which dialetheists explicitly reject. Dialetheism holds that some contradictions are true, and developing a principled account of which ones requires careful logical machinery: paraconsistent logics, restricted inference rules, formal criteria for identifying truth-value gluts.
The fiction provides none of this machinery. It simply declares contradictions without specifying which ones hold and which don't. This means that for any power level claim P in the fiction, you have no principled basis for asserting P is true while not-P is false. "This character is omnipotent" does not automatically defeat "this character is not omnipotent" just because you want it to. Without a containment mechanism—which the fiction doesn't supply and the scaler hasn't constructed—neither claim wins over its negation. The character is not established as omnipotent. They are stranded in an indeterminate space where no capability can be firmly attributed to them.
This is not a powerful character. This is a character about whom power level claims cannot be made.
Conclusion 2: No combat result can be treated as decisive.
If the fiction can declare true contradictions without a principled containment mechanism, then for any defeat D recorded in the fiction, you have no basis for asserting D is true while not-D is false. Every recorded defeat is simultaneously unestablished as a defeat. Every death is simultaneously unestablished as a death. Every failure is simultaneously unestablished as a failure.
The scaler invoking this framework to protect their character's victories has also, necessarily, given their opponent the same tool to protect their character's victories. But more importantly: the framework doesn't actually protect victories either. The scaler is implicitly claiming their character's wins are real while their losses are contradicted away. But why should victories be privileged over defeats under this framework? There is no principled answer. Without containment machinery, defeats are exactly as protected as victories. The framework doesn't selectively shield wins—it makes the concept of a decisive result unavailable to both parties equally. You have not produced an undefeated character. You have produced a character for whom the concepts of victory and defeat no longer apply.
Conclusion 3: The fiction cannot communicate anything.
A statement carries information only insofar as it excludes its negation. When a story says "the hero survived," that statement carries information precisely because it distinguishes the world where the hero survived from the world where they didn't. If both the statement and its negation are simultaneously unresolved—if the fiction provides no principled basis for determining which holds—the statement carries no information. It does not distinguish any state of affairs from any other. Extend this to every statement in the fiction and the fiction becomes a document that cannot communicate any fact about its own world. It is not a story. It is noise that resembles a story.
This conclusion directly defeats the steelman's most interesting move. The steelman claimed that the author is communicating something that exceeds the expressive capacity of logic. But if the framework makes information transmission impossible, the author isn't communicating that thing either. The beyond-logic entity isn't described. The communication of its beyond-logic nature doesn't occur. The steelman's most philosophically sophisticated point—that paradox is the author's intentional communicative act—is undermined by the framework the steelman requires. You cannot use a framework that destroys communication to explain how communication of something incommunicable is achieved.
Conclusion 4: The steelman refutes itself.
The steelman is a logical argument. It uses structured sentences with stable word meanings to make a claim that it expects the reader to understand through logical inference. It asserts premises, draws conclusions, and anticipates objections. Every one of these acts presupposes the validity of logic—stable meanings, non-contradictory claims, inferential structure that the reader can follow.
The steelman says: logic cannot capture certain fictional entities. But the steelman itself is a logical act that only succeeds if logic is valid. It is using the tool it claims is inadequate. It is saying, in structured grammatical sentences with stable word meanings: "structured grammatical sentences with stable word meanings cannot capture this." The self-refutation is not incidental. It is the core problem. You cannot coherently argue that logic fails here, because the coherence of the argument presupposes logic's validity. The moment the argument succeeds in convincing you, it has demonstrated that logic works well enough to make the case—which is precisely what it was trying to deny.
Conclusion 5: The framework cannot be used to make any character more powerful than any other.
This is the most practically relevant conclusion. The framework is invoked asymmetrically: contradictions protect my high-end feats while my opponent's anti-feats that cap my character are dismissed. But asymmetric application requires a containment mechanism that determines which contradictions hold. Without one, the framework applies with equal force to everything: your high-end feats, your opponent's high-end feats, every anti-feat on both sides, every scaling chain both of you have constructed. Your high-end feat is unestablished. So is your opponent's. Your character's anti-feats are unresolved. So are your opponent's. Nothing is protected because everything is equally destabilized.
The framework is not a shield. It is a flood that drowns both sides of the debate equally and indiscriminately. The character is not elevated above their opponent. Both characters are dragged down into a space where no claim about either of them can be firmly made. That is not a victory condition. That is the dissolution of the contest.
Argument Tactics That Become Impossible
If this framework is adopted honestly, the following moves—which constitute the overwhelming majority of powerscaling debate—are no longer available:
Feat-based scaling. You cannot establish that a character has a capability based on a demonstrated feat, because the feat and its negation are both unresolved. "Character A destroyed a planet" does not establish planet-busting capability because "Character A did not destroy a planet" is equally unresolved.
Anti-feat debunking. You cannot use a moment where a character failed at something to cap their power level, because the failure and its negation are both unresolved. This sounds like it helps scalers, but it cuts both ways—your opponent's anti-feats against your character are equally protected.
Proof by contradiction. You cannot assume a power level, derive a contradiction, and conclude the power level is false. Under this framework the contradiction doesn't falsify the assumption. The assumption and the contradiction can both hold. Every argument of the form "but that would mean X, which contradicts Y" becomes unavailable.
Modus ponens in scaling chains. The inference "if A then B, A is true, therefore B is true" is weakened under paraconsistent logics to the point of unreliability. Scaling chains—which are sequences of exactly these inferences—cannot be run. "Character A scales to Character B who scales to Character C" requires each inferential link to transmit truth reliably. Under this framework, no link transmits truth reliably.
Modus tollens. You cannot argue "if this character were truly universal, they couldn't have been harmed by this planetary attack, but they were harmed, therefore they are not universal." The move from "the consequent is false" to "the antecedent is false" requires the law of non-contradiction to hold. It doesn't here.
Disjunctive syllogism. You cannot argue "either this feat is outlier or it reflects true power, it is not an outlier, therefore it reflects true power." This inference is explicitly restricted in paraconsistent logics.
Consistency-based arguments. You cannot argue that an interpretation should be rejected because it creates inconsistency with other established facts. Inconsistency is not a problem under this framework. It is the framework.
Hierarchy arguments. You cannot establish that Character A is more powerful than Character B based on comparative feats, because the comparative claim and its negation are both unresolved. "A is stronger than B" and "A is not stronger than B" are equally unestablished.
Outlier dismissal. You cannot dismiss a low feat as an outlier inconsistent with the character's established level, because inconsistency is not grounds for dismissal under this framework. Every feat, no matter how contradictory, must be treated as equally valid—which means the character simultaneously has every power level implied by every feat they have ever had, which means they have no determinate power level at all.
Author intent arguments. You cannot argue that the author clearly intended a certain power level because authorial intent is a claim about a determinate state of affairs—what the author meant—and determinate states of affairs are precisely what the framework dissolves.
Narrative context arguments. You cannot argue that a feat should be interpreted in light of its narrative context, because doing so requires logical inference from the context to the interpretation—inference rules that the framework has made unreliable.
The Pattern
Every conclusion and every lost argument tactic follows the same structure. The framework is invoked to get something: an omnipotent character, an undefeated record, a protected high-end feat, immunity from anti-feat debunking. But the framework, applied honestly, destroys the very concepts that make those things meaningful or achievable. You want an undefeatable character. The framework gives you a character for whom the concept of defeat is indistinguishable from its negation. You want to win a debate. The framework gives you a situation in which winning and losing the debate are equally unestablished. You want your high-end feats to hold while your opponent's anti-feats don't. The framework gives you a flood that destabilizes everything equally.
The steelman is genuinely interesting as philosophy. As a tool for powerscaling it is perfectly, completely, and irreversibly self-defeating—not because it is weak, but because it is too strong. It dissolves everything, including the things it was supposed to protect. The scaler who picks up this framework as a weapon has picked up a grenade with the pin already pulled. It does not matter how tightly they hold it. It will destroy their position just as thoroughly as their opponent's.
The entire concept of space-time destruction is unquantifable and incoherent. The idea that 2 universes = infinitely above 1 universe is also incoherent. The idea that 2 uncountably infinitely large spaces are bigger than just one is also incoherent.
Nope. I do things for real. I don't tolerate illogical fanfiction. If you admitted that this was literal fanfiction with no truth to it and that any character is any level (and thus there's no wank or downplay whatsoever) then you're free. You seem to be rather objective (despite your hypocrisy) so I'll continue to go after you.
CRTs are bullshit.
You have not earned it.
Yeah the spanish language document has weird syntax in the original.
EDIT: fyi the kratos debunk is a series of level 5 to 6 argument that requires you to ignore evidence (level 5) or perform logical contradictions (level 6) which is always a good sign that VSBW is wholly in the right here and doesn't have to be supported by unironic postmodernist slop argument ad populum arguments (sarcasm).
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Eden_Warlock99
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I miss Her
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Damn, you skimmed my post harder than hell lmfao
3-A I can accept for DBS loosely, so... yeh.
You're arguing with ghosts, I flat-out said there wasn't a consensus, and that it is decided by a select few individuals Basically everyone can have major gripes with
So most of fiction lmfao
Hey if you want to drop a JoJo meme in a text-based format, you gotta also predict things like punctuation based off what the person does. Which you didn't so L
fixed that spoiler for you
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You don't really have anything substantial.
Great! Then we agree. 3-A would also apply to DBH/X due to the same problems.
You made a claim that consensus determines truth. I refuted the claim and the ideology it came from. Do you have anything more to say.
Opponent unable to address my arguments? Free victory for ALEPH the GOAT.
Didn't address my arguments award. I win this one.
Fixed your post
dareaperman wakes up in the airport 0.000001 seconds after facing wittgenstein.
hulk sees him there
dareaper is like. wtf. why is hulk here
hulk said 'hulk was beaten by broly...let's go to heaven together'
hulk walks into heaven with dareaper
the end
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I seperate DBH from everything else because I haven't consumed le fookin media
When did I do that? Never.
I don't need to address illogical hogwash that's genuinely more incoherent than the blog that got AI translated.
Ew, capeshit character, get it outta here
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ME:
YOU: 'Yes indeedy.'
stoplying.com
They call you 007
0 counterarguments against my position
0 ability to not commit logical fallacies whenever someone doesn't put up with VSBullshit
7 dodges of my point
Infinite Ws for the GOAT ALEPH.
Based capeshit hater
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My legitimate response to that information:
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farts and dies
My legitimate response to that information:
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Do me a favor and spread bobbit worm gifs around like that. They're nice.
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maybe
Fezzih_007
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I give people infinite slander. I could fill the Tour De Force with infinite memes mocking everyone but I don't because I'm polite(ish). You could make infinite capeshit slander from the tabs that debunk them.
You gave me a new slander Idea.
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@ALEPHGOAT can you go after DC in like a year from now? I kinda wanna see what happens for reasons that I can’t disclose.
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I already went after DC.
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All of this is utter nonsense, that's my view on you trying to impose your view on others.
Who are you to decide what's "illogical" and what's not? Fiction by its very nature runs on being illogical.
Just admit you're mad about how highly certain characters and series are scaled here and be done with it. Otherwise, you're acting like a tantrum-throwing toddler due to not being taken seriously.
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This is the entire point of powerscaling. To force your view on others by defending your view and refuting others. If there's no truth then there's no wank, no downplay, no wrong or right results. Any character can beat any other character for any reason period.
The Three Laws of Thought. The framework that makes reasoning possible. Every single argument you do uses them. Go on. Make an argument without them. Let's see how well you do.
Already refuted this argument. Try again.
Baseless ad hominem. I could call everyone here stupid crayon eating morons for being wrong. I don't because
1. That's a dick move
2. I do not actually believe that. The people here are smart, just misguided.
I could call you a seething idiot who can't counter my arguments and has to resort to insulting me. I don't because of the two reasons above.
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Noooo, I mean really go after DC. Like, staff only thread, all the arguments put out in the open in a concise and digestible manner, on the site and not in some google doc, you know, like a real crt. Doing it like you are now won’t get anything done, but perhaps if you played the game, things could change.
Though of course you should only do it after a year for reasons I can’t disclose.
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Then why are you here? Do you just wish to yap about things to “convince” people and not to actually get things done? To me, that just seems like a waste of time, because so far, no one has bitten. And if you can’t convince anyone of it, then what are you even trying to debate for?
no
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To get arguments against my positions and my arguments for my positions.
Yes, because I think the entier system of VSBW is flawed.
idk man holding out hope lol
The truth of an argument doesn't depend on if you can convince anyone of it.
I give you ten dollar good sir
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You do realize that this is a hobby and that it's subjective to begin with, right?
"Three Laws of Thought" by Aristotle, the same guy who got debunked by Newton? Yeah, I'll totally take his word as valid.
You haven't refuted shit; all you've done is make yourself look like an ass.
You trying to impose your will by saying that the work that everyone's done in this subjective hobby is "wrong" somehow is you insulting everyone, so don't act like you're innocent when you've been flinging shit since the moment you posted here.
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Okay, it's subjective. Looks like Kid Goku beats DC and Marvel. He rips off Galactus's head and throws it at the Presence so hard both DC and Marvel are vaporized in the explosion. The surviving Superheroes and abstracts all team up to hit him with maximum power but he just tanks it and blows them up with his mind. Then Caillou kills him with a 9 mm to the back of the head.
Oh wait you don't actually believe what you're saying and are just using it as an excuse to not address my points. Example 21390218309218309218309281321.
Exactly when did this happen? Oh let's play along with this obvious fanfiction that didn't happen. First step: is your argument your argument or not. Does it refute my position or not. Did you state it or not.
You haven't argued against any of my points. You have done nothing but expose your own lack of ability to argue.
Okay so Simon solos fiction now. He just finger snaps and all of fiction dies. Nice. Anyway saying and proving someone's positions and arguments to support said positions are wrong is imposing my will, but so is VS debating.
Sir, making an argument against a position you don't agree with isn't an insult. Just what did YOU do to me in the first message YOU sent to ME here?
Proving people wrong is flinging shit? LMAOOO
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well now
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The blatant dupe account is trying to muddy the waters by misrepresenting what I said, how nice. If you must know, by "subjective" I meant that standards of evidence can vary not just from person-to-person but series-to-series.
It happened when Aristotle tried presenting his Prime Mover idea centuries ago and Isaac Newton laughed at it via his own experiments. I take it you've never read any criticisms of Aristotle because there are a lot of critics regarding the Three Laws of Thought, about how they're not as ironclad as Aristotle believed.
Law of thought - Wikipedia
Why are Aristotle followers like you unable to read criticism of his works?
Finally, you're still making up strawmen arguments to knock down; none of us said anything about whatever it is you claimed I or others did. Good job winning an argument with yourself or whatever.
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I'm not a dupe. More ad hominem. You're awful at debating.
They don't. Like what are you talking about?
Hitchen's razor. Also none of this is an actual refutation to the three laws of thought. In fact, you didn't do that because you're making an argument against my position which you believe is false. So is my position false or is it true?
First. I would like to ask this: WHY are you using Wikipedia as a source? Anyone can go and edit them. But I'll address the 'counters' to my positionI take it you've never read any criticisms of Aristotle because there are a lot of critics regarding the Three Laws of Thought, about how they're not as ironclad as Aristotle believed.
Law of thought - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
Among contemporary logicians, the expression "laws of thought" is widely regarded as obsolete.[1] The reasons for this can be summarized as follows:
1. This claim is just an assertion, not an actual argument.
2. Entirely irrelevant to my point.
3. Non-classical logics don't have any relevance to powerscaling. I proved this in the section of the Tour De Force I copied and pasted here.
I have. I narrowed it down to powerscaling and as it turns out, Aristotle is good for powerscaling. You want to argue against my claims? Read what I wrote. You can't read what I wrote? Then you can't argue against my claims, you can't refute my claims, therefore, I win.
Prove what I said is a strawman.
Prove that.
Thanks for handing me another W.
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Actually years old lmao
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Yeah, no one cares about your W's except for you who is clearly a dupe account that somehow got allowed to post here. I don't give a shit how well you think I am at debating; in my view, this isn't a debate because I do not respect you.
As for using Wikipedia as a source, you do realize they have citations, right? Something you've failed to do even once during your "crusade" of bringing the "Aristotlean truth" to powerscaling.
Bertrand Russell used mathematics to debunk Aristotle's Three Laws of Thought as well, saying they're "theorems" instead, not to mention saying that predicate logic does everything Aristotle's Three Laws of Thought does but better.
Now, I'll end it with this: stay mad that no one takes you seriously and will never take you seriously.
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How watching two Sub-500 post members go at each other's throats feels like
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My uncle cares, so no.
Stop accusing me of being a dupe just because you can't argue.
Ah so blatant rules violation. Can you follow the rules of your own site ffs.
The thing you posted doesn't have citations.
Nobody has refuted my claims. I'm of the belief nobody can refute my claims but I'm open to change. Which is why I came here. So come on. If not you, someone else can. Come on.
Hitchen's razor. Back up your claims.
Predicate logic is first order logic. FIRST ORDER LOGIC IS BUILT ON THE THREE LAWS OF THOUGHT. https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/~david/cl/fol-hodges. STOP TALKING ABOUT THINGS YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND.
Stay mad that you can't refute me. Enjoy your reports.
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