This will be my final, and only helpful contribution to this thread.
Materialization and Possibilities:
It’s been argued by Pain that since these futures are only considered “possibilities” and need to be actively “materialized” into the “limited world” it necessarily means these “possibilities” don’t physically exist, in the sense of actualization.
My contentions with this argument are around two issues, one being semantical in nature while one being evidential in nature, i'll address the semantical issue in this section of my post.
My semantical issues with Pain’s argument would be her acting like both of the words “
materialized” and “
possibilities” are singular in definition, regardless of context. “Materialized”
doesn't inherently imply that the object, event or structure in question didn’t exist previously, on any material level, while “possibilities”
doesn’t inherently imply object unreality.
I'd use an analogy to explain the “materialized” aspect of that sentence: Say that an apple (which in our case would be the infinite possible futures) exists within a separate pocket dimension (which in our case would be Kandaquizorte). While examining everything on a cosmological scale, the apple is actualized, it's a fact of reality. But when examined on a more specific scale, such as the universe of a world separate from that pocket dimension (which in our case would be the “limited world” brought up by Nafta), that apple doesn’t exist, it hasn’t become an objective fact within the confines of that world. So when it’s brought into that specific world, it is “materialized” into it because it’s becoming an actual fact of reality in said world.
This would be analogous to our situation since it’s entirely possible (and i believe, provably so) that these possible futures do actually exist in the grand scheme of things, but when examined on a more specific level, they’re only “possibilities” since they don’t actively exist within that world, so the action of them materializing wouldn’t be an innate counter towards them actually existing or not.
Now with my contentions with the “possibilities” argument would simply be “possibilities”, definitionally, don’t prescribe nor describe any level of ontological existence, “possibilities” are just events which may happen, a meteorite striking Earth could possibility happen, that doesn’t mean both the meteorite or Earth are abstract, non-physical concepts which exist purely in the mind, these are objects that are actualized, they do physically exist. So just because these infinite futures are described as “possibilities” doesn’t mean they aren’t real, or don’t exist on any meaningful level.
Evidence for Actualization:
My evidential issues with Pain’s argument would be the existence of Kandaquizorte, Nafta’s authority. It’s explained to us that Kandaquizorte “
is future itself”, that it’s “
many futures of this world”, and the exact amount of those futures are described to be “
infinite”. If Nafta’s authority exists on a actualized level, it’s necessarily so that those futures which it’s defined to be, would also exist on that exact same actualized level. So unless you have direct confirmation that Nafta’s authority doesn’t actually exist, and instead exist within the mind, or any other non-physical, ontological state, it’s necessarily so those futures do exist. That’s the logical consequence of these set premises.
I’d further support my interpretation through the fact
Kandaquizorte’s stated to have equal shape to the physical world, shapes are by definition, the graphical representation of an object, or its external properties, if an object doesn’t have physical existence, it’s unlikely to have physical expression of visual properties either, such as shapes. If an object does exist, then it’s likely to have physical expression of visual properties, such as shapes.
Concluding Statements:
So after reviewing all the provided evidence, under my ultimately unbiased perspective, it's seemingly true that these futures do actually exist and aren't just abstract possibilities, it's seemingly so it requires less assumptions to claim true when compared to the opposition, so i'm in general agreement that these are actual, existing futures, so 2-A, at least spatially, is fine, now whether or not these are separate timelines, idk for sure, so i'll let other, more knowledgeable people argue on that.
Now this post has been made, i'mma head off and do my boxing training, chao everyone.