- 10,934
- 12,424
Alrighty, guys, it took way longer than I wanted but I finally finished that summary.
I excluded a number of points I could have talked about (e.g. the ranking order between qualitative superiorities), but it is already way too long as is. So I will restrict myself to these main points.
Now I suppose we just wait for @Agnaa to present a summary of his points and once he does I can go and tag all staff members.
I hope we can refrain from further debate and just let the voting proceed... then again, I suppose we probably should answer questions if they happen.
Anything to do after the voting is probably best left to after Ant's vacation is over.
If a character is deemed omnipotent, possessing the ability to accomplish anything, the question arises: are they Tier 0? Theoretically, yes. Yet we have no characters that are Tier 0 for that reason.
Why? Due to the inherent challenge of conclusively proving the prerequisite of true omnipotence. Our reliance on a feat-based analysis prevents us from interpreting even explicit statements of omnipotence as encompassing elements beyond the scale and nature defined within the narrative.
The same problem plagues Ultima's proposal. The assumption that needs to be met is such that the characters are of a nature that they are above the destruction of all dimensions in power, including all possible extensions of dimensions beyond what the verse has or has ever mentioned, beyond even dimensions that the mathematics which the verse uses has, to the point of transcending every dimension ever conceivable. That would even include dimensions real life humanity didn't even know about at the time the work was written.
Achieving Tier 0 status hinges on fulfilling this assumption. The challenge lies in the absence of practical cases convincing enough to substantiate a character's possession of such a nature. To date, no compelling instance has persuaded me to consider a character as having transcended every conceivable dimension.
And then there is that two things that are the same in nature are considered the same thing by this being. Universes, being the specific example. Now, this is a little harder to interpret, as this is of course figurative. It's not like from a human perspective this is the case, but this is only the case from the perspective of the god.
One could argue three options here:
2. can be taken as superiority, but not necessarily one of such a huge scale. Everything that dwarfs universes by an infinite extent views them as being 0 in size, both if there is one or two universes. Now, when I say "dwarfs to an infinite extent" I don't mean strictly in size. I mean in the rough idea of power that we use to even be able to quantify things with non-size-based powers.
For 3. I would invoke the principle of explosion and reason nothing from it.
Based on this statement in isolation, would I say that there is a dimensional space so large that the character must be in it? No, of course not.
But would I say this character has power that lets him destroy dimensional spaces of every conceivable size? Also no. It doesn't seem to say anything of that nature.
I think our main difference in position is that I believe that there can be characters that are by nature superior to some number of dimensions (BDE Type 2), while only being outside of dimensions for the rest (BDE Type 1). Which includes characters that are beyond dimensions in their verse, but not beyond all in another one.
Well, that and our willingness to take an unspecific "beyond space" statement and assume that all conceivable notions of space are included without explicit mention of that. Which brings up to the "beyond the concept of dimensions":
Compounding the issue, authors often depict concepts as both attached to reality and as qualities of being simultaneously. Contrary to the assertion that these two aspects are mutually exclusive, our current standards on concept manipulation indicate otherwise. Type 2 concepts, for example, are concepts limited to specific realms and possess the property of 'the quality of being X.' Every character currently possessing Concept Manipulation Type 2 serves as a counterexample by the standards in place.
Quite frankly, his claim to have knowledge of every ever-conceived branch of philosophy raises an eyebrow as well. Especially as, as a philosophy professor in a lecture I was in once roughly put it, "there is nothing universally agreed upon in philosophy".
Let me pick up his boat metaphor next and just ask: Would you rank being "beyond the concept of boats" as Tier 0? A boat the size of any dimensionality is conceivable, so by the argument it would have to be included. In fact, isn't a boat in a world infinite R>F hierarchies above our universe conceivable as well, making being beyond the concept of boats in fact far superior to being infinitely beyond dimensions by this logic?
My argument for boats and for dimensions is the same: It wouldn't. No regular reader would interpret it as such and it is unlikely to be the intention.
In fact, let's bring up the understanding of what we call concepts in some other branches of philosophy. A frequent key aspect of moderate realism is that universals (i.e. concepts in this context) are in fact existing within space and time. This limits concepts to cosmological scale in practice, including their possibility. If concepts are not independent of space and time, having a concept beyond space and time (or beyond reality in a general sense) becomes impossible unless the space is devoid of concepts. As such a space larger than those with concepts in it is indeed inconceivable for the verse.
Another viewpoint comes from trope theory. There properties of objects exist in the form of "tropes" and what we call concept is the equivalence relations between tropes (or belonging to a certain equivalence class). In (the common branches of) trope theory non-existent things lack tropes and, consequently, equivalence relations. Therefore, the concept of space in trope theory doesn't extend to things beyond actual space. One can also do the reverse: Tropes have their properties due to belonging to a class, where the class then acts much like a universal. The consequences remains the same: Being "beyond the concept of x" does not include theoretical things, as the concept itself does not apply to purely theoretical constructs.
I believe in the space between Realism and Nominalism one can probably find a number of further takes on the matter, like some moderate nominalistic views that admit something resembling concepts.
Of course, there is some inherent silliness in even invoking those ideas: Authors mostly use far more nebulous ideas, as already evidenced by them using the word 'concepts' instead of more specific, theory-related, words like 'universals'. They likely have no rigorous idea of the extent of their claims which makes extremely high-end interpretation very questionable.
What being beyond definitions is concerned: By itself it only means the definition is inapplicable to you. Saying you are "power wise beyond a definition" lacks technical coherence. What is meant would likely be either "power wise beyond all things that fulfil this definition" or "power wise above all things that could ever fulfil this definition" or "power wise above all that could be conceived to exist that would fulfil the definition". I don't think it's valid to just assume the latter.
Furthermore, just as one could ask whether a multiverse-sized boat is a boat in the common sense of the word, one could ask whether an infinite-dimensional space is a space in the common sense of a regular person: You can't do physics in it and can't have a proper notion of size. If a concept is taken as a definition, then as words can have different definitions, we need to take care that "the concept of x" can include different things depending on how x is defined. In fact, consider that large cardinals are not even part of regular mathematics, meaning that by all common rigorous definitions of the term dimensions they would not be included in the notion of "being beyond dimensions".
TL;DR: Ranking characters superior to all dimensions, including every conceivable notion of them, as Tier 0 is in theory fine. The suggested level of evidence required to be considered to be of that nature is too lenient. To qualify, statements supporting this nature should be as specific as the assumption itself.
Why? Due to the inherent challenge of conclusively proving the prerequisite of true omnipotence. Our reliance on a feat-based analysis prevents us from interpreting even explicit statements of omnipotence as encompassing elements beyond the scale and nature defined within the narrative.
The same problem plagues Ultima's proposal. The assumption that needs to be met is such that the characters are of a nature that they are above the destruction of all dimensions in power, including all possible extensions of dimensions beyond what the verse has or has ever mentioned, beyond even dimensions that the mathematics which the verse uses has, to the point of transcending every dimension ever conceivable. That would even include dimensions real life humanity didn't even know about at the time the work was written.
Achieving Tier 0 status hinges on fulfilling this assumption. The challenge lies in the absence of practical cases convincing enough to substantiate a character's possession of such a nature. To date, no compelling instance has persuaded me to consider a character as having transcended every conceivable dimension.
On the Non-Concept Related Example
Let's examine the practical example presented by Ultima:Beyond space? The idea of directions is inapplicable? Certainly beyond dimensional existence, but no superiority so far.
And then there is that two things that are the same in nature are considered the same thing by this being. Universes, being the specific example. Now, this is a little harder to interpret, as this is of course figurative. It's not like from a human perspective this is the case, but this is only the case from the perspective of the god.
One could argue three options here:
- There is actually only one universe and the human perspective is wrong.
- There are two universes and the god just means that from his perspective there would be no relevant difference to them being just one universe.
- It's a paradoxical state of both being really two universes and really being one universe simultaneously.
2. can be taken as superiority, but not necessarily one of such a huge scale. Everything that dwarfs universes by an infinite extent views them as being 0 in size, both if there is one or two universes. Now, when I say "dwarfs to an infinite extent" I don't mean strictly in size. I mean in the rough idea of power that we use to even be able to quantify things with non-size-based powers.
For 3. I would invoke the principle of explosion and reason nothing from it.
Based on this statement in isolation, would I say that there is a dimensional space so large that the character must be in it? No, of course not.
But would I say this character has power that lets him destroy dimensional spaces of every conceivable size? Also no. It doesn't seem to say anything of that nature.
I think our main difference in position is that I believe that there can be characters that are by nature superior to some number of dimensions (BDE Type 2), while only being outside of dimensions for the rest (BDE Type 1). Which includes characters that are beyond dimensions in their verse, but not beyond all in another one.
Well, that and our willingness to take an unspecific "beyond space" statement and assume that all conceivable notions of space are included without explicit mention of that. Which brings up to the "beyond the concept of dimensions":
On the Concept-Related Example
Let's start with thisDespite being called "non-standard" here this kind of concept is, in my experience, prevalent in fiction. Instances of concept manipulation frequently don't even affect the entire setting. Fictional portrayals of supernaturally manipulated concepts typically do not imply inclusion of every conceivable related element. This demonstrates well that this notion is not as universally accepted as Ultima suggests. We cannot default to assuming "concept" holds such an expansive definition, considering its varied usage in fiction.
Compounding the issue, authors often depict concepts as both attached to reality and as qualities of being simultaneously. Contrary to the assertion that these two aspects are mutually exclusive, our current standards on concept manipulation indicate otherwise. Type 2 concepts, for example, are concepts limited to specific realms and possess the property of 'the quality of being X.' Every character currently possessing Concept Manipulation Type 2 serves as a counterexample by the standards in place.
Quite frankly, his claim to have knowledge of every ever-conceived branch of philosophy raises an eyebrow as well. Especially as, as a philosophy professor in a lecture I was in once roughly put it, "there is nothing universally agreed upon in philosophy".
Let me pick up his boat metaphor next and just ask: Would you rank being "beyond the concept of boats" as Tier 0? A boat the size of any dimensionality is conceivable, so by the argument it would have to be included. In fact, isn't a boat in a world infinite R>F hierarchies above our universe conceivable as well, making being beyond the concept of boats in fact far superior to being infinitely beyond dimensions by this logic?
My argument for boats and for dimensions is the same: It wouldn't. No regular reader would interpret it as such and it is unlikely to be the intention.
In fact, let's bring up the understanding of what we call concepts in some other branches of philosophy. A frequent key aspect of moderate realism is that universals (i.e. concepts in this context) are in fact existing within space and time. This limits concepts to cosmological scale in practice, including their possibility. If concepts are not independent of space and time, having a concept beyond space and time (or beyond reality in a general sense) becomes impossible unless the space is devoid of concepts. As such a space larger than those with concepts in it is indeed inconceivable for the verse.
Another viewpoint comes from trope theory. There properties of objects exist in the form of "tropes" and what we call concept is the equivalence relations between tropes (or belonging to a certain equivalence class). In (the common branches of) trope theory non-existent things lack tropes and, consequently, equivalence relations. Therefore, the concept of space in trope theory doesn't extend to things beyond actual space. One can also do the reverse: Tropes have their properties due to belonging to a class, where the class then acts much like a universal. The consequences remains the same: Being "beyond the concept of x" does not include theoretical things, as the concept itself does not apply to purely theoretical constructs.
I believe in the space between Realism and Nominalism one can probably find a number of further takes on the matter, like some moderate nominalistic views that admit something resembling concepts.
Of course, there is some inherent silliness in even invoking those ideas: Authors mostly use far more nebulous ideas, as already evidenced by them using the word 'concepts' instead of more specific, theory-related, words like 'universals'. They likely have no rigorous idea of the extent of their claims which makes extremely high-end interpretation very questionable.
What being beyond definitions is concerned: By itself it only means the definition is inapplicable to you. Saying you are "power wise beyond a definition" lacks technical coherence. What is meant would likely be either "power wise beyond all things that fulfil this definition" or "power wise above all things that could ever fulfil this definition" or "power wise above all that could be conceived to exist that would fulfil the definition". I don't think it's valid to just assume the latter.
Furthermore, just as one could ask whether a multiverse-sized boat is a boat in the common sense of the word, one could ask whether an infinite-dimensional space is a space in the common sense of a regular person: You can't do physics in it and can't have a proper notion of size. If a concept is taken as a definition, then as words can have different definitions, we need to take care that "the concept of x" can include different things depending on how x is defined. In fact, consider that large cardinals are not even part of regular mathematics, meaning that by all common rigorous definitions of the term dimensions they would not be included in the notion of "being beyond dimensions".
TL;DR: Ranking characters superior to all dimensions, including every conceivable notion of them, as Tier 0 is in theory fine. The suggested level of evidence required to be considered to be of that nature is too lenient. To qualify, statements supporting this nature should be as specific as the assumption itself.
To begin this section I would invite everyone with some stamina to just read this post of mine. My summary will largely consist of a shortened version of it, along with additions that should hopefully clear up Ultima's misunderstanding of my argument. So if you find something I say vague, maybe look at that post. Chances are it has a more in-depth explanation of the same.
In terms of Ultima's summary this replies to this part:
Transitioning from n to n+1 dimensions doesn't imbue a space with soul-like qualities; it remains physical. Increasing your physical size alone will never make you capable of interacting with souls. There is no continuous gap between physical space and spiritual planes. Spiritual planes of existence / souls are not made up of any number of physical things.
So would a spiritual plane have superiority to spaces of all size and be a qualitative superiority? Would a spiritual plane inferior to the physical universe be lower than all dimensions? No, that would be far-fetched.
The flaw in this argument lies in its reliance on non-spatial nature as the sole basis.It asserts that the disparity between reality and fiction is not analogous to the distinction between different dimensional levels, leading to the conclusion that one must be inherently superior to the other. However, this assumption is flawed. Two entities can be incomparable without establishing a hierarchy of superiority.
To illustrate this with a mathematical analogy: the comparison is more akin to real numbers and imaginary numbers than finite numbers and infinity. The imaginary unit, 'i,' cannot be directly compared to any real number. Despite the non-quantitative difference, it would be incorrect to label it as bigger or smaller in any meaningful sense.
Ultima's definition is incomplete. His criteria set forth fail to establish a power-like relationship; they merely assert a lack of interaction without explaining why this absence constitutes a superiority akin to power. In my opinion, a power relationship requires an argument that the character actually has power that they can wield to destroy those realms lower than them or an argument that they possess power equivalent to such a power.
However, this power dynamic can also operate indirectly. Consider a hypothetical bug on the same higher level of existence as the aforementioned character, holding only a fraction, say 0.01%, of their power. Despite this fractional strength, the bug still transcends the reality with infinitely less power than the character it is compared to.
The latter case addresses Ultima's recurring assertion that my proposal contradicts the current norm of not demanding evidence for the ability to destroy fictional worlds. To clarify, I am not making that claim, and I am uncertain why Ultima attributes it to my position.
Ultima likes to keep bring up as a counterpoint that our current R>F page does not specify a need to show a power relationship over lower realms to gain R>F transcendence. He says that "they are functionally more analogous in nature to Durability, since, as said, Reality-Fiction Transcendence is entirely about "What others can't do to you," rather than "What you can do to others." It's just that this unassailable nature derives from something analogous to "size" in the character."
As the writer of the current criteria, I can say with confidence that this is against the spirit of the rules. They are not written to be applied in the context of transcending things that are not actually part of the world viewed as fiction. As said above, currently the power aspect is usually implicitly implied by the circumstances. If you see a world as a book then your assumed ability to damage that suffices as proof. However, the same implicit argument for power cannot be extended to theoretically larger worlds that do not exist in the book and thus would not be destroyed by the book's destruction.
In other words, the reason the rules don't mention such a criterion is because it isn't necessary in our current system where R>F only scales you a level above the realms shown part of the fiction.
This aspect has been evident in past debates, particularly when discussing humans pulled into a higher plane of existence by a superior character. The consistent answer in such cases has been that the character doesn't automatically scale to the tier of the higher plane by merely observing it. They scale only when they perform a feat on that higher plane. This requirement is precisely due to the emphasis on demonstrating power, as mentioned earlier.
TL;DR While a character with a Reality-Fiction (R>F) disparity may exhibit qualities of incorporeality or non-interactability with dimensions in general, analogous to souls, NEP, BDE Type 1, etc., the proposed arguments lack evidence to establish a superior power relationship over any entity not explicitly part of the fiction that the higher plane characters looks down upon.
As highlighted in Ultima's summary, various perspectives on how R>F transcendence operates find utility in fiction, and many of these predict a substantially lower level of power for R>F transcendence. Consequently, Ultima needs criteria that not only support his theory on how R>F works but also establish its prevalence over alternative interpretations that suggest lower tiers.
What I will do in the following is to first really briefly mention some alternate perspectives. My long explanation has a section called "Alternatives on the nature of reality and fiction in fiction". I would really encourage you to read the detailed explanation there for more explanation and examples. While a comprehensive understanding is available in that section, I keep it concise here as these alternatives haven't been fundamentally challenged as valid options thus far (Ultima's objection mainly rests on their non-alignment with his specific definition of R>F).
After that brief excursion, we will see if Ultima's three criteria ensure that his, and not some possible other understanding of R>F, is used. If they fall short, there is no basis to assume a high-tier interpretation in fictions meeting his requirements. This would naturally lead us to default to a lower level, adhering to the established principle of ranking characters at the lowest reasonable tier.
Hence, we are talking about fake notions of R>F here. That in itself already shows that we are operating at an "anything goes" level, as we really can't draw upon knowledge of how the relationship between reality and fiction should function from the real world, if we already assume it is a fake form of it. In principle an author can play a fake difference however they like, or even not think them through at all, so the four kinds I bring up are just arbitrary examples.
Last thing to note before we get to those examples: If the nature of the fake supernatural kind of fiction in a verse is limited in size in some way, so that it couldn't be larger than some quantitative level, then a R>F difference can not be argued to put you above all notions of size. For larger sizes they might still be hard to interact with (like physical entities can't interact with souls), but power wise there is no evidence of superiority. One could also put it like this: If another verse had a space much larger than what in this verse could be contained in fiction, then that space could never be fictional in this verse to begin with. It would be above the nature of what is transcended. So the in-universe relationship wouldn't apply to that other larger space at all.
In general, pretty much every R>F difference may describe the higher world as "more real". Anything can be called such if from the higher world perspective you're just a toy or something.
So what this criteria really only requires is indeed what it says: To "see the lower world as something immaterial, and insubstantial".
However, that alone doesn't exclude much.
Digital worlds, viewed independent of hardware such as worlds made from Type 2 Information can be described as such from a higher world perspective as well.
Many people in real life have described dreams as such, despite the scope of dreams in real life being tightly connected to the brain and the dream worlds hence sharing its limitations.
In a world exhibiting a 'fiction-like' quality, a higher entity existing beyond its plot may perceive the plot as the information composing a story in their mind. The lesser reality has that fiction-like property of being composed of plot that the higher reality might lack (until viewed from higher realities). The interaction between the two can be entirely immaterial, given their distinct properties. Something plot-like is probably immaterial to something not plot-like, after all.
As for Concepts limiting R>F... well, Plato's Cave is about concepts. It is intended to work with concepts following platonism, but the same principle works with other types or even non-conceptual givers of properties... or at least a similar one. Nothing contradicts there being a higher reality of (from a lower perspective) abstract nature that exists even beyond the conceptual level.
Technically even a non-R>F higher world can meet this, as just a quantative gap such that the lower reality is from your perspective of 0 size already will behave immaterial and insubstantial from the higher world perspective, as it has no influence on the world, can't be touched and can simply be passed through. Heck, you could have two types of matter that don't interact with each other and from the perspective of one kind the other kind is immaterial. That wouldn't even be a power gap.
As an example: Umineko certainly passes this criteria. I can link to the explanation blog that goes into great detail on how higher worlds are conceptually different and of higher more real quality, with lower worlds being insignificant. But not everyone wants to read that much, so to present my personal favourite example: Featherine writes in a higher world that Lambdadelta is hit by 'something'. Hence, in the lower world she is in, she gets hit by something indescribable, as the lower reality is so fiction-like that something not determined in the higher world will not have any properties in the lower world. Things literally don't exist beyond what they got written as in Umineko.
TL;DR I think there are many ways a higher world with a quantative gap to the lower one can describe the lower world as "immaterial and insubstantial". Even something like the lower world being just a shadow is in principle just a case of "higher world determines the state of lower world". We have examples of things that take the description of lower worlds as 'unreality' quite serious still thinking of the gaps as quantitative. So this alone does not ensure that no lower interpretation is used.
Needless to say, Umineko also meets this criteria. That much is clear from the quantitative difference explanation I already showed. That's not all either. They outright say that higher worlds would destroy a human were they to suddenly be ascended to a god, due to some nature of the higher worlds.
A prime example of meeting this criteria.
It reads like a No True Scotsman fallacy.
"No R>F difference is quantitative."
"Here are examples that are quantitative."
"Ok, but no true R>F difference is quantitative."
The issue here is that this criteria only exists to hide the symptoms of the former two criteria in fact not proving what is desired. This one just says "If you have a counter-example to my theory, this criterion makes it not actually a counter-example, as this criterion excludes all counter-examples."
Take the Bravely Default example Ultima used. If we removed Ouroboros and his plan from the game, then this third criterion would also be fulfilled. So we would take the R>F difference to be valid. Yet, the removal of the villain has not actually altered the nature of R>F in the verse. It just hides that Ultima's theory on how R>F works is not used in this work of fiction.
This is also the criteria in which the Umineko example would fail. Since it went into more detail on the nature of its R>F, giving actual explanations about the gap, it would get a far lower tier than if it had just withheld that information and let us just blindly commit to Ultima's theory.
In Bravely Default's example, one could say that they are doing something illogical and that no theory can account for breaking logic. And sure, maybe.
However, as I demonstrated there are alternative views on how R>F works that also meet those criteria and for those one can not say that they are breaking logic.
The Umineko example, for instance, doesn't seem to be logically contradictory. There is just no universal truth on how (the non real-life kind of) R>F works that would prohibit a verse from having a realm view a lesser realm as proper fiction yet simultaneously not have the higher realm be superior to all notions of size imaginable. Incomparable to regular spatial things due to having a fundamentally different nature? Maybe. But superior? No, nothing forces that to be the case.
Also, think of the number of verses we have that explicitly confirm that their R>F is above all quantitative sizes, so that they explicitly share Ultima's view. Then compare this to the number of verses that have proper R>F (fulfil the former two criteria) but fail to the third one, hence demonstratively taking a different view on the nature of "true" R>F than Ultima. Is the number so greatly in favour of the former that we are comfortable just assuming that the verses where it's not clearly said which one applies are using Ultima's point of view? Is the former even bigger than the latter? Because if a fiction frequently violates even a technically valid rule (e.g. lightning being lightning speed, not applying to many cases of magical lightning) then we usually require more evidence to err on the side of caution.
TL;DR: I believe there are logically consistent alternative views on how R>F works, which do not require superiority to all notions of quantitative size. There are reasonable cases that would pass Ultima's criteria despite not using his theory. We shouldn't assume that a verse uses such massive high end interpretations if there could be and most likely are many authors that do not actually intend to use those for their work of fiction.
Superiority is neither independence nor being non-interactability alone
This is the first half of the main argument. What I wish to show is this: Ultima's criteria for a quality-based superiority over all quantitative differences (i.e. all conceivable sizes and dimensions) is not sufficient to actually show superiority. It instead only demonstrates that the things in question have a different nature.In terms of Ultima's summary this replies to this part:
The flaw becomes evident when considering whether the same rationale applies to souls existing on a spiritual plane.
Transitioning from n to n+1 dimensions doesn't imbue a space with soul-like qualities; it remains physical. Increasing your physical size alone will never make you capable of interacting with souls. There is no continuous gap between physical space and spiritual planes. Spiritual planes of existence / souls are not made up of any number of physical things.
So would a spiritual plane have superiority to spaces of all size and be a qualitative superiority? Would a spiritual plane inferior to the physical universe be lower than all dimensions? No, that would be far-fetched.
The flaw in this argument lies in its reliance on non-spatial nature as the sole basis.It asserts that the disparity between reality and fiction is not analogous to the distinction between different dimensional levels, leading to the conclusion that one must be inherently superior to the other. However, this assumption is flawed. Two entities can be incomparable without establishing a hierarchy of superiority.
To illustrate this with a mathematical analogy: the comparison is more akin to real numbers and imaginary numbers than finite numbers and infinity. The imaginary unit, 'i,' cannot be directly compared to any real number. Despite the non-quantitative difference, it would be incorrect to label it as bigger or smaller in any meaningful sense.
Ultima's definition is incomplete. His criteria set forth fail to establish a power-like relationship; they merely assert a lack of interaction without explaining why this absence constitutes a superiority akin to power. In my opinion, a power relationship requires an argument that the character actually has power that they can wield to destroy those realms lower than them or an argument that they possess power equivalent to such a power.
However, this power dynamic can also operate indirectly. Consider a hypothetical bug on the same higher level of existence as the aforementioned character, holding only a fraction, say 0.01%, of their power. Despite this fractional strength, the bug still transcends the reality with infinitely less power than the character it is compared to.
The latter case addresses Ultima's recurring assertion that my proposal contradicts the current norm of not demanding evidence for the ability to destroy fictional worlds. To clarify, I am not making that claim, and I am uncertain why Ultima attributes it to my position.
Ultima likes to keep bring up as a counterpoint that our current R>F page does not specify a need to show a power relationship over lower realms to gain R>F transcendence. He says that "they are functionally more analogous in nature to Durability, since, as said, Reality-Fiction Transcendence is entirely about "What others can't do to you," rather than "What you can do to others." It's just that this unassailable nature derives from something analogous to "size" in the character."
As the writer of the current criteria, I can say with confidence that this is against the spirit of the rules. They are not written to be applied in the context of transcending things that are not actually part of the world viewed as fiction. As said above, currently the power aspect is usually implicitly implied by the circumstances. If you see a world as a book then your assumed ability to damage that suffices as proof. However, the same implicit argument for power cannot be extended to theoretically larger worlds that do not exist in the book and thus would not be destroyed by the book's destruction.
In other words, the reason the rules don't mention such a criterion is because it isn't necessary in our current system where R>F only scales you a level above the realms shown part of the fiction.
This aspect has been evident in past debates, particularly when discussing humans pulled into a higher plane of existence by a superior character. The consistent answer in such cases has been that the character doesn't automatically scale to the tier of the higher plane by merely observing it. They scale only when they perform a feat on that higher plane. This requirement is precisely due to the emphasis on demonstrating power, as mentioned earlier.
TL;DR While a character with a Reality-Fiction (R>F) disparity may exhibit qualities of incorporeality or non-interactability with dimensions in general, analogous to souls, NEP, BDE Type 1, etc., the proposed arguments lack evidence to establish a superior power relationship over any entity not explicitly part of the fiction that the higher plane characters looks down upon.
The Core Problem: The Criteria For "True" R>F Fails to Distinguish From Lower Level Interpretations of the Idea
The relevance of the prior section's argumentation, questioning the proof of superior power, hinges on the existence of alternatives to a Reality-Fiction nature that bestows such power.As highlighted in Ultima's summary, various perspectives on how R>F transcendence operates find utility in fiction, and many of these predict a substantially lower level of power for R>F transcendence. Consequently, Ultima needs criteria that not only support his theory on how R>F works but also establish its prevalence over alternative interpretations that suggest lower tiers.
What I will do in the following is to first really briefly mention some alternate perspectives. My long explanation has a section called "Alternatives on the nature of reality and fiction in fiction". I would really encourage you to read the detailed explanation there for more explanation and examples. While a comprehensive understanding is available in that section, I keep it concise here as these alternatives haven't been fundamentally challenged as valid options thus far (Ultima's objection mainly rests on their non-alignment with his specific definition of R>F).
After that brief excursion, we will see if Ultima's three criteria ensure that his, and not some possible other understanding of R>F, is used. If they fall short, there is no basis to assume a high-tier interpretation in fictions meeting his requirements. This would naturally lead us to default to a lower level, adhering to the established principle of ranking characters at the lowest reasonable tier.
Alternative options on the nature R>F
R>F working like in real life is technically a possible assumption, but Ultima already made clear that he doesn't wish to use that and I don't want to either. He doesn't want to use it since lower reality worlds don't actually exist in real life fiction and I, in addition to that, don't want it since fiction never depicts it correctly and it's a huge NLF.Hence, we are talking about fake notions of R>F here. That in itself already shows that we are operating at an "anything goes" level, as we really can't draw upon knowledge of how the relationship between reality and fiction should function from the real world, if we already assume it is a fake form of it. In principle an author can play a fake difference however they like, or even not think them through at all, so the four kinds I bring up are just arbitrary examples.
Last thing to note before we get to those examples: If the nature of the fake supernatural kind of fiction in a verse is limited in size in some way, so that it couldn't be larger than some quantitative level, then a R>F difference can not be argued to put you above all notions of size. For larger sizes they might still be hard to interact with (like physical entities can't interact with souls), but power wise there is no evidence of superiority. One could also put it like this: If another verse had a space much larger than what in this verse could be contained in fiction, then that space could never be fictional in this verse to begin with. It would be above the nature of what is transcended. So the in-universe relationship wouldn't apply to that other larger space at all.
- Concepts limiting R>F: In the BDE section I already argued in length about how concepts in general can have quantitative limitations, both from a philosophical perspective, from the perspective of our current concept manipulation standards which say they do and from the fact that plenty of fictions treat concepts that way. Many fictions portray concepts as superior to other elements within the verse, including the plot and plot-manipulation powers. Consequently, the potential size of fictional worlds is often confined to the boundaries set by the world's concepts. In real life R>F an author could just change the concepts of their fictional world if they want to make a bigger one, but in our verses they don't necessarily have that power and especially not the one to stretch spatially limited concepts to arbitrary sizes. At least I don't know a single example of that being mentioned. It would require special evidence in any case and wouldn't be what we default to.
- Computational power limiting R>F: Lower worlds in R>F relationships can be of a digital nature. But a digital world needs to be run on a computer in a higher reality or something like that. This computer would have the ability to make a certain amount of calculations per second to run the simulation of the lower reality. Now, the more stuff you have in the simulation, the more calculations you need to be able to run it. For higher infinity many things you would need higher infinity computation power. So there is a very practical limit to how much you can put in the simulation. One could argue that is no limit on size: You could put lore into a game and while the thing described in the lore is not simulated, on the fictional level it could be considered existent in the same way the contents of a book are. That's one valid viewpoint. On the other hand, we may see it from the perspective of someone in the simulation for which something that doesn't exist as digital object, can not actually enter the simulation and is only described by lore text, may as well be viewed as not really existing. Some philosophical branches go as far as to say that something that can't be experienced doesn't exist to start with. So I think there is also a valid point of view of a simulation-based R>F having a computational limitation on size and we should account for the possibility of an author might thinking that. The same also applies to dreams as our brain also only has limited space. In fact, humans can additionally not truly imagine higher dimensions. Anything beyond the human's (or more generally the dreamers) comprehension could be argued to be impossible to be part of a dream world by nature. I should add that simulations being rooted in the physical in the higher world does not mean they are not true fiction, just like a story may be tied to the letters in a book but the fiction itself existing in a more metaphysical sense.
- Fiction having a "fiction-like" quality limiting R>F: In metafiction, it is not rare to for there to be a "plot" or something, that is like an underlying field that makes up the reality of a fictional world. It's often similar in nature to concept, essences, information, causality or laws of nature. And just as laws of nature often differ from one universe to the next, plot is often a local thing, where a character might be able to just manipulate it in a limited area. In that case, the fiction can not be larger than the area covered by plot. In fact, often the beings with a R>F relationship wouldn't really have any tools to interact with something beyond the plot as that's where their power over reality originates. So anything larger than what that verse's plot field can contain would be beyond what can be contained in that verse's fiction.
- It just works: Also a valid case. Authors have no need to think deeply about it and much less to come to a conclusion that is any like ours. It's one thing to say that real life stuff should generally work like real life stuff, but who are we to tell them how fake R>F should work? The moment we drop the "like in reality" assumption we really give up our right to make a default assumption about how it works. Umineko for example has perfectly valid R>F portrayal, yet also drops the infamous analogy about how R>F differences are quantitative. It has a perfectly valid treatment of R>F otherwise (a little of which I will show in the next section). I find it difficult to say that, for the fake supernatural analogy of R>F we are talking about, the author's approach is categorically invalid and should not be considered as an option. Nor do I think we can say that any author with the same opinion would always specify that for them the difference in quantitative in the work of fiction.
Checking the three criteria for 'true' R>F
Now let's explore the three R>F criteria Ultima produced:Let's check them for how effective they are in excluding alternatives and in ensuring that the nature matches what he expects in general.
What immediately weakens this point is that we are never talking about R>F "how it is in real life", as discussed before. The worlds are, for instance, never truly non-existent. If they were that, or illusionary, in the literal sense then nothing could stop a R>F character with author powers to add whatever they like into the fiction, including Tier 0 stuff. It would just be like adding something to fiction in reality. But Ultima isn't saying they can do that and sets a (as far as I am concerned fairly arbitrary) limit as to what they can create. (See the "Ultima's proposal" section in my long post for more on that)
In general, pretty much every R>F difference may describe the higher world as "more real". Anything can be called such if from the higher world perspective you're just a toy or something.
So what this criteria really only requires is indeed what it says: To "see the lower world as something immaterial, and insubstantial".
However, that alone doesn't exclude much.
Digital worlds, viewed independent of hardware such as worlds made from Type 2 Information can be described as such from a higher world perspective as well.
Many people in real life have described dreams as such, despite the scope of dreams in real life being tightly connected to the brain and the dream worlds hence sharing its limitations.
In a world exhibiting a 'fiction-like' quality, a higher entity existing beyond its plot may perceive the plot as the information composing a story in their mind. The lesser reality has that fiction-like property of being composed of plot that the higher reality might lack (until viewed from higher realities). The interaction between the two can be entirely immaterial, given their distinct properties. Something plot-like is probably immaterial to something not plot-like, after all.
As for Concepts limiting R>F... well, Plato's Cave is about concepts. It is intended to work with concepts following platonism, but the same principle works with other types or even non-conceptual givers of properties... or at least a similar one. Nothing contradicts there being a higher reality of (from a lower perspective) abstract nature that exists even beyond the conceptual level.
Technically even a non-R>F higher world can meet this, as just a quantative gap such that the lower reality is from your perspective of 0 size already will behave immaterial and insubstantial from the higher world perspective, as it has no influence on the world, can't be touched and can simply be passed through. Heck, you could have two types of matter that don't interact with each other and from the perspective of one kind the other kind is immaterial. That wouldn't even be a power gap.
As an example: Umineko certainly passes this criteria. I can link to the explanation blog that goes into great detail on how higher worlds are conceptually different and of higher more real quality, with lower worlds being insignificant. But not everyone wants to read that much, so to present my personal favourite example: Featherine writes in a higher world that Lambdadelta is hit by 'something'. Hence, in the lower world she is in, she gets hit by something indescribable, as the lower reality is so fiction-like that something not determined in the higher world will not have any properties in the lower world. Things literally don't exist beyond what they got written as in Umineko.
TL;DR I think there are many ways a higher world with a quantative gap to the lower one can describe the lower world as "immaterial and insubstantial". Even something like the lower world being just a shadow is in principle just a case of "higher world determines the state of lower world". We have examples of things that take the description of lower worlds as 'unreality' quite serious still thinking of the gaps as quantitative. So this alone does not ensure that no lower interpretation is used.
This one is obviously fulfilled by any higher reality that has an infinite difference to the lower. Being infinitely bigger meets the criteria as would other power gaps, such as worlds in cultivation stories that can only be reached once you have cultivated up to a certain level.
Needless to say, Umineko also meets this criteria. That much is clear from the quantitative difference explanation I already showed. That's not all either. They outright say that higher worlds would destroy a human were they to suddenly be ascended to a god, due to some nature of the higher worlds.
And as the explanation blog says language of beings from the higher worlds, such as gods, could not even be spoken on lower realms and contains more information.
A prime example of meeting this criteria.
Honestly, I feel like this one is more admitting that the criteria don't work than that the criteria helps.
It reads like a No True Scotsman fallacy.
"No R>F difference is quantitative."
"Here are examples that are quantitative."
"Ok, but no true R>F difference is quantitative."
The issue here is that this criteria only exists to hide the symptoms of the former two criteria in fact not proving what is desired. This one just says "If you have a counter-example to my theory, this criterion makes it not actually a counter-example, as this criterion excludes all counter-examples."
Take the Bravely Default example Ultima used. If we removed Ouroboros and his plan from the game, then this third criterion would also be fulfilled. So we would take the R>F difference to be valid. Yet, the removal of the villain has not actually altered the nature of R>F in the verse. It just hides that Ultima's theory on how R>F works is not used in this work of fiction.
This is also the criteria in which the Umineko example would fail. Since it went into more detail on the nature of its R>F, giving actual explanations about the gap, it would get a far lower tier than if it had just withheld that information and let us just blindly commit to Ultima's theory.
In Bravely Default's example, one could say that they are doing something illogical and that no theory can account for breaking logic. And sure, maybe.
However, as I demonstrated there are alternative views on how R>F works that also meet those criteria and for those one can not say that they are breaking logic.
The Umineko example, for instance, doesn't seem to be logically contradictory. There is just no universal truth on how (the non real-life kind of) R>F works that would prohibit a verse from having a realm view a lesser realm as proper fiction yet simultaneously not have the higher realm be superior to all notions of size imaginable. Incomparable to regular spatial things due to having a fundamentally different nature? Maybe. But superior? No, nothing forces that to be the case.
Also, think of the number of verses we have that explicitly confirm that their R>F is above all quantitative sizes, so that they explicitly share Ultima's view. Then compare this to the number of verses that have proper R>F (fulfil the former two criteria) but fail to the third one, hence demonstratively taking a different view on the nature of "true" R>F than Ultima. Is the number so greatly in favour of the former that we are comfortable just assuming that the verses where it's not clearly said which one applies are using Ultima's point of view? Is the former even bigger than the latter? Because if a fiction frequently violates even a technically valid rule (e.g. lightning being lightning speed, not applying to many cases of magical lightning) then we usually require more evidence to err on the side of caution.
TL;DR: I believe there are logically consistent alternative views on how R>F works, which do not require superiority to all notions of quantitative size. There are reasonable cases that would pass Ultima's criteria despite not using his theory. We shouldn't assume that a verse uses such massive high end interpretations if there could be and most likely are many authors that do not actually intend to use those for their work of fiction.
I excluded a number of points I could have talked about (e.g. the ranking order between qualitative superiorities), but it is already way too long as is. So I will restrict myself to these main points.
Now I suppose we just wait for @Agnaa to present a summary of his points and once he does I can go and tag all staff members.
I hope we can refrain from further debate and just let the voting proceed... then again, I suppose we probably should answer questions if they happen.
Anything to do after the voting is probably best left to after Ant's vacation is over.
