Type 3 Concept Manip is not superior to normal abilities.

[Regidian]

Even normal Aristotelian concept erasure would warrant type 1, so this wiki's jacked up version would as well.

I mean about abstract existance type 1 based on type 3 concept

 

[Ricsi-viragosi]

My bad, misread that.

Uh... KingPin is suggesting full on revising CM to not be greek specific, and potentially not have types, instead using only what is said in-story. If that were done, than abstract existence would work depending on feats.

 

[QuasiYuri]

It would have types. The current proposal can be seen in the Staff Discussion thread on the subject.

 

[KingPin0422]

Yeah, I don't know where you got the idea that Conceptual Manipulation will no longer have types. All I said was that the types shouldn't be specifically based on Greek philosophy because stuff like Jungian archetypes and Kantian noumena, at least as far as I can tell, should be comparable to Platonic Forms by virtue of not being dependent on the objects that they encompass. Basically, the power will be simplified down to these three types:

1. Concepts that are abstract, govern reality, and do not depend on the objects that participate in them. These concepts are not necessarily on a higher level of existence, however.
2. Concepts that are abstract and govern reality, but are dependent on objects participating in them to exist.
3. Concepts that are abstract, but do not govern reality - instead, they are governed by how sentient beings perceive them.

Of course, there also exist non-abstract concepts, such as what Idealism or Nominalism outline. These concepts can only exist in the mind and therefore are purely subjective with no influence on reality whatsoever, whereas even a lesser realist concept should still have the power to affect things in reality, despite technically being subordinate to it. For this reason, we can't assume that every mention of concepts refers to an abstract kind of concept, and manipulating non-abstract concepts can simply be Mind Manipulation or some offshoot of it.

 

[Lawiegg]

Wait
By this logic
Most of our concept manipulation type 3 SCPS arent type 3 then.

 

[Rikimarox2]

Let's not bring SCP here for now. They are outdated, iirc.

 

[KingPin0422]

I know jack shit about SCP, but if they're outdated, then it's best if we let the experts on the verse revise the conceptual manipulation of the characters.

Anyway, this won't get anywhere without staff input. I'll do what I can to boost the signal.

 

[Lawiegg]

Hmm

 

[Agnaa]

I think it does make more sense for concept manip to work as described in the OP.

I'd think that Abstract Existence Type 1 would still be possible with type 3 concepts being treated in this way.

I'm not sure how type 3 could have an abstract being. Concepts with Aristotle cannot exist without matter. Having someone with abstract existence would be like having a square without matter. It doesn't work.

The concept still exists with matter, it's just that it has an abstract being tied to it. If the matter were to all be destroyed/change, the abstract being would disappear. Sorta like Hetalia characters.

 

[QuasiYuri]

I know jack shit about SCP, but if they're outdated, then it's best if we let the experts on the verse revise the conceptual manipulation of the characters.

Anyway, this won't get anywhere without staff input. I'll do what I can to boost the signal.

I think it would be good to continue the actual revision instead of doing too much threads at the same time.

 

[Iapitus_The_Impaler]

I find this point to be irrelevant. Can't an author decide how math works in their fiction? Either way, I don't see how choosing to be more accurate to Aristotle's philosophy will put a stop to such a topic.

If those concepts exist independently of matter and of the objects that participate in them, then they are not Aristotelian concepts. Our own Conceptual Manipulation page outright says:

Also, I'll just say now that we plan to make it so that independent universal concepts are not automatically treated as being ontologically greater than the reality they govern. By default, they're just not bound to it, just like how we separate type 0 Beyond-Dimensional Existence from the other types. Superiority shouldn't be a default assumption without the verse giving reason to believe that such is the case.

My point was on how we treat verses without further context. Usually "aethereal" concepts were taken as type 3 by default; In other words when the author doesn't make a direct cosmological statement on it. If numbers are bound the way that concepts are in the OP, then numbers that do not have a specific physical set of objects containing them simply do not exist. Like if there were hypothetically only 2 objects in existence, then the numbers above like 3 would not exist as a concept. It would be easy to say that math is bound to some level of existence, but saying that it is bound to objects by default is simply too extreme a verse claim to be made without further evidence. Anyway, I'll circle back around to my main 2 points. If we go with this:

1. We need a different kind of concept that is bound to a "level" of existence or a space as opposed to objects that individually participate in them. I'm not opposed to us making concepts more accurate to the original on principle, but many of the concepts we currently treat as type 3 do not work. We need something else closer to how the type 3 concepts were practically treated some of the time as well.
2. We need to change how we treat concepts by "default." If we are getting way more particular with our definitions, we should not be working under such specific cosmological claims with no other context. Math is an example of a concept that was previously treated by default that becomes too extreme a claim a claim under such circumstances

Except that Type 3 has often been used to describe also concepts bound to a level of existence, instead of just being transcendent of it. Things like Entropy. Think of them like the concepts that all or functionally all of reality participates in instead of just particular objects. I know the definition, but there can be a functional definition and a literal one, especially when most of the time we end up just shoving concepts into the closest one on the list

Sounds like we need another type that is to go along with the one that is not superior then. I'll say this as well, those definitely are not Platonic concepts if they are not ontologically superior to the reality they govern, so we will need a new name for those. Perhaps let's find the name of a philosopher who claims such, and call them that. We can keep the concepts that are ontologically superior as called platonic concepts, if we are gonna be trying to stick to the original philosophers more

 

[Iapitus_The_Impaler]

On another note

Type 3 Conceptual Manipulation would be altering the attribute without needing to do so through the object. So, making the bronze ball into a square without needing to exerting energy on it.

The problem is... this isn't special. Things like being sentient, or alive, are still considered part of something's shape. So... death and mind manipulation that work without affecting a person's body would also be equal to type 3 - altering an attribute.


Mind, this doesn't make all non-physical abilities type 3 conceptual manipulation. Aristotelian conceptual manipulation assumes everything that exists has attributes, it's something that affects whole cosmologies if acknowledged, while simple mind manipulation tells us that sentient beings have a mind unrelated to their brain. All that is changed here, is that if someone uses type 3 concept manip to death manip an enemy with resistance to "normal" death manipulation, it won't automatically "lol concept" the resistance away.

Oh, and being erased conceptually with Type 3 means nothing beyond mind/soul/body erasure, and only gives type 1 NEP.

Okay, so to invert this, this means that implicitly any verse that does treat conceptual death manipulation for example as superior to other death manipulation, or a verse that does treat erasing something on a conceptual level as a step above erasing the mind/soul/body would automatically not be type 3 concepts then. You can resist something on a physical level, but not necessarily have a resistance to having your attributes altered directly. I know you said this isn't a CRT, but if this "clarification" is accepted, then this is going to change the profiles that are currently indexed with type 3 conceptual abilities in a verse that treats these as being superior to just normal abilities.

 

[Ricsi-viragosi]

Well, yes, that is the point of saying type 3 isn't superior.

That, or change the definition of type 3, since Aristotle's own wasn't really what it seems to be meant. It seems more to be trying to take an "ideal" concept without it being superior to objects. Which might exist, but isn't aristotelean.

 

[QuasiYuri]

Tbf the new def wouldn't really imply stuff like "dependent concept=super death"

 

[Agnaa]

On another note

Okay, so to invert this, this means that implicitly any verse that does treat conceptual death manipulation for example as superior to other death manipulation, or a verse that does treat erasing something on a conceptual level as a step above erasing the mind/soul/body would automatically not be type 3 concepts then. You can resist something on a physical level, but not necessarily have a resistance to having your attributes altered directly. I know you said this isn't a CRT, but if this "clarification" is accepted, then this is going to change the profiles that are currently indexed with type 3 conceptual abilities in a verse that treats these as being superior to just normal abilities.

Whoa whoa whoa whoa whoa whoa whoa, what the ****? And why is Risci agreeing to this?

If a verse demonstrates concepts on a certain level but says a sub-effect of them, i.e. death manipulation, is stronger than we'd usually expect for that kind of concept, that doesn't mean it's suddenly a stronger type of concept.

Conceptual death manip being superior to normal death manip does not mean the concept is automatically type 2. It just means that that verse's conceptual death manip is stronger than normal death manip.

 

[Ricsi-viragosi]

It doesn't have to be type 2 to not fit type 3. As said above and in the very response, the current type 3 should be changed if that's what it is meant to present.

Because shock of the shocks, Plato and Aristotle are not the be all end all of concepts and basing a system in just them was dumb from the beginning of it.

 

[Agnaa]

Making other types is a fine solution. Upgrading from Type 3 to Type 2 despite acting like Type 3 in all ways except "Conceptual death manip overpowers normal death manip" is not.

 

[Iapitus_The_Impaler]

Whoa whoa whoa whoa whoa whoa whoa, what the ****? And why is Risci agreeing to this?

If a verse demonstrates concepts on a certain level but says a sub-effect of them, i.e. death manipulation, is stronger than we'd usually expect for that kind of concept, that doesn't mean it's suddenly a stronger type of concept.

Conceptual death manip being superior to normal death manip does not mean the concept is automatically type 2. It just means that that verse's conceptual death manip is stronger than normal death manip.

I was pointing out the consequences of this because I thought they would object to it.

I mean, I would argue that yes it does (mostly speaking in the context of "defaulting" to a certain kind of concept), tho I am not sure "stronger" is the right word. Its just that the concepts within this verse is a "stronger" kind that is not Type 2. This is the problem with getting a lot more particular about our definitions when we basically used to just shove most concepts into the closest type.

It just makes it a "stronger" concept that isn't type 2. If a property of Type 3 concepts is that it will not be inherently be on any higher level, then the concepts being inherently on a higher level means it is not type 3. That does not make it type 2 tho.

 

[Agnaa]

Sure I guess, there's no way that we'll be able to create enough types to cover all the different ways that concepts work in fiction. I know a verse with a mix of type 3 and 4 that doesn't really fit, so there can prolly be "stronger" type 3 concepts.

Although I would hesitate a bit to call it a "stronger" concept that isn't type 2, as there's other mediocre arguments we can provide for how that conceptual death manip's stronger. Perhaps a more pure application of the property of "death" to an object is just more potent than ordinary death-magic. I would hesitate to make one feat like that put all of a verse's concepts above another type 3 verse's.

 

[Ricsi-viragosi]

I'm fine with types being made to be general descriptions that allow for more liberty on mechanics, and them just not being superior by default.

 

[GreatIskandar14045]

This seems make sense to me, nice works.

 

[KingPin0422]

My point was on how we treat verses without further context. Usually "aethereal" concepts were taken as type 3 by default; In other words when the author doesn't make a direct cosmological statement on it. If numbers are bound the way that concepts are in the OP, then numbers that do not have a specific physical set of objects containing them simply do not exist. Like if there were hypothetically only 2 objects in existence, then the numbers above like 3 would not exist as a concept. It would be easy to say that math is bound to some level of existence, but saying that it is bound to objects by default is simply too extreme a verse claim to be made without further evidence. Anyway, I'll circle back around to my main 2 points. If we go with this:

1. We need a different kind of concept that is bound to a "level" of existence or a space as opposed to objects that individually participate in them. I'm not opposed to us making concepts more accurate to the original on principle, but many of the concepts we currently treat as type 3 do not work. We need something else closer to how the type 3 concepts were practically treated some of the time as well.
2. We need to change how we treat concepts by "default." If we are getting way more particular with our definitions, we should not be working under such specific cosmological claims with no other context. Math is an example of a concept that was previously treated by default that becomes too extreme a claim a claim under such circumstances

I don't like assuming concepts are abstract to begin with. Non-abstract concepts exist, and I'm pretty sure many authors aren't thinking about a particular definition of concepts when they mention them. Sure, you can use context clues to figure out what the author meant when they mentioned concepts, but otherwise, I disagree with having a "default assumption" for the nature of concepts.

Also, to address your distinction between concepts bound to some level of existence and concepts bound to objects: the entire point of the Conceptual Manipulation revision that's being discussed right now is to be more flexible with concepts and not enforce the arbitrary limitations we do now. We're already going to make it so that independent universal concepts (Platonic Forms, etc.) need not transcend the reality they govern, for example, so your point here is moot.

Except that Type 3 has often been used to describe also concepts bound to a level of existence, instead of just being transcendent of it. Things like Entropy. Think of them like the concepts that all or functionally all of reality participates in instead of just particular objects. I know the definition, but there can be a functional definition and a literal one, especially when most of the time we end up just shoving concepts into the closest one on the list

As explained above, that can still fall under dependent universal concepts. No need to make an all new type just because of a small variation that one type of concept can have.

Sounds like we need another type that is to go along with the one that is not superior then. I'll say this as well, those definitely are not Platonic concepts if they are not ontologically superior to the reality they govern, so we will need a new name for those. Perhaps let's find the name of a philosopher who claims such, and call them that. We can keep the concepts that are ontologically superior as called platonic concepts, if we are gonna be trying to stick to the original philosophers more

What the hell? Why would concepts need to be transcendent over their reality to qualify as Platonic? Also, I thought I made it clear earlier that we're not sticking to Greek philosophy anymore. As incredible as it may seem, abstract concepts go beyond simply Plato and Aristotle. We shouldn't give those two special treatment just because of their significance.

---

Anyway, I agree that we should reevaluate our default treatment of conceptual powers. If a conceptual power is considered by the verse to be better than other means of using that same power, then sure, we can go ahead and say that it's better for the purposes of VS threads. If the verse doesn't make a statement on it, though, then I don't think it should be assumed to be inherently superior. This extends to all types of concepts: I don't think concepts being independent of the reality they govern implies conceptual death manipulation automatically being better than other means of death manipulation if the verse doesn't say that it is.