Since the Tier 0 in question is based uniquely on a realism-based worldview (according to what you said), wouldn't extensions or alternate viewpoints to realism have the possibility of things exempt from this chain of reasoning or, even, the possibility of things that can defeat a monad in a logically non-contradictory manner?
There really was just never a contradiction to begin with, since a Tier 0 isn't part of the set of objects whose existence is consistent with certain axioms. It is those axioms, and things are consistent with its existence. So it subordinates everything to itself, and not the other way around. So it wouldn't really be something "in" a possible world so much as the basis through which you can say possible worlds exist at all.
Funnily enough this is directly adjacent to something that came up while I was discussing this with Deagon, off-site. He objected to my claim that any verse with a Tier 0 would already necessarily be taking a realist standpoint with regards to the Absolute, since it, after all, doesn't really have to be an Universal or anything. It can be a non-physical particular.
Stories that purposefully operate under illogic are, at the end day, not really something which the Tiering System ever catered (Or should cater) to. Remember what I've said: We ultimately reasoned that not even characters with Nonexistent Physiology are really absolutely nothing, since clearly they aren't, and thus concluded that they're really just "nonexistent" in a qualified form. This sort of stuff is just basic things that ground the logic of the wiki at large, before we even start thinking about tiers. Basically embedded into our very reasoning.
Depends on how this "All-in-Two"ness works. If it's A and B summing up to obtain something larger than A and B alone, then I'd say that is, indeed, inherently below perfect ontological simplicity. Something that is absolutely primal and irreducible to anything other than itself, being above something that is reducible in such a manner, is perfectly reasonable.
But there are other bases through which you can say possible worlds exist; other axioms. And so, the monad you're describing is only a subset of a greater collection, that of "all things made possible through any set of axioms", yet you would put this no higher than High 1-A+, creating a contradiction.
We could end up with two verses, one of which says their monad can't do paradoxes, and one of which says their monad can, yet you'd give them the same tier and the same abilities, despite one explicitly being able to do more than the other.
It's not really a contradiction, because you seem to think that "The Monad exists" and "The Monad doesn't exist," themselves, form two distinct possible worlds, which isn't really the case. It's less "The entity whose existence is true at (Important to distinguish between truth-at-a-world and truth-in-a-world) all possible worlds actually doesn't exist according to some possible worlds, which is a contradiction" and more "We simply don't know the logic circumscribing all possible worlds, or if it even exists, and there are different opinions on this corresponding to different frameworks." High 1-A+ isn't really "all frameworks" in that sense.
That's not really an issue. Being able to do more doesn't equal being stronger. At best, this would cause concerns relating to how they'd both be listed as having "Omnipotence" in their P&A, but listing the specifically showcased applications of this omnipotence (For indexing's case, if nothing else) amends this well enough.
This is a pretty flimsy point overall, since it's not actually a criticism of the proposals themselves, so much as a criticism of an example I've used of a character who I believe qualifies for them. And I don't think your arguments against this particular case are that good, either, or founded on things that clear or obvious. This summary of events is essentially your (Obviously biased) viewpoint of a rather brief discussion that took place off-site and is thus meaningless for the purposes of this thread.
Again, if you're saying that "possible worlds" is according to one set of axioms, it is plausible for a series to invoke a collection of "possible worlds" which explicitly extend over all axioms (i.e. having different such sets for different axioms), which would be broader than High 1-A+/0 under your system, causing an issue.
Yes it does, being able to actualize/destroy constructs which other characters can't actualize/destroy does equal being stronger.
Problem is that a Monad that is declared as such under a realism based viewpoint may be defeated by a logically coherent expansion of it.
We tier things by the lowest reasonably possible interpretation and I think there is no denying that Monad statements can be made on lower R>F levels.
This is inaccurate. Or rather, it is not a universally held opinion even amongst the proponents of these philosophies. None of these characteristics are universally held by religions or schools of thought. For instance, I'd say Adi Shankara's conception of Brahman is largely reflective of what you are proposing:
However, this is not the only interpretation. Far from it. Every single one of these characteristics is rejected in some school of thought or another.
It is meant to serve as a demonstration of my above point and the further peril that lies with this approach, such that we are essentially going to extrapolate a specific conception of Monadhood out of extremely limited evidence, such as a single reference to being "all in one" and assume that not only does it encompass a myriad of other characteristics that were never established in the verse and are not logically required by monadhood, but that all contradicting information is subjugated to the metaphorical, even when it is incredibly direct, like outright stating that the "Monad" is the chief among a race of beings that live in the void.
What do you mean by "mere" philosophers? It's a philosophy and theology, no one has ownership or greater authority over it compared to anyone else. Even then who are we to decide who counts and who doesn't? I can't agree with this take, it would be like dismissing an Eastern Orthadox viewpoint because they aren't as dedicated as American Amish in worship.
In case there is a misunderstanding, I am not just citing random philosophers or contemporary Hindu gurus, I am citing the beliefs of highly highly influential figures, who are considered the founders of large branches of Hinduism. These are the main individuals I am drawing from:
They certainly were not Buddhas, because they were Hindu and not Buddhist. As to the term "Siddha" it seems to be prominent in Jainism but its usage in Hinduism is inconsistent.
A verse could try to do this, yeah, but as soon as it tries to, it ultimately just disqualifies any of the things within those possible worlds from being Monads at all, by placing them inside an actual system of distinctions that exists outside their purview. Honestly a very incoherent thing to posit overall. That the thing above ontological differentiation is, in fact, embedded within a system of ontological differentiation, just because our discourse about it leads to us thinking of scenarios where it exists and scenarios where it doesn't. It's why I said that "All logically possible things" is self-defeating as a definition for High 1-A+, earlier, and amended it to "All logically possible contingent things."
Not really, in this case. It's not like Monads who can't enact contradictions are unable to do so because contradictory states-of-affairs are "too much" for them, or somesuch. The very idea is pretty weird, since you can obviously have Tier 2 characters who can actualize paradoxes and also 1-A characters who can't do such a thing, and yet you wouldn't say that this somehow causes problems. This way of viewing things largely breaks down when you try to insert something as non-linear as "Can actualize a paradox" into the equation.
Oh boy. Bear with me:
This argument seems to be based on the aforementioned flawed understanding of the concept being proposed here, so, it's likewise erroneous. The Monad, if anything, would be the basis for any other concepts and properties, since it'd be embody pure "Being," which everything else presupposes by nature. Properties are inherently assigned to objects, which means that when you say "X is red," you presuppose that there is such a X, to begin with – Notice how the notion of "existence" is already conceptually prior to the predication of "redness" itself, there. And so likewise the Monad is prior to any properties save itself (And defines what "property"hood means, to begin with)
It's fairly strange to speak about "qualities" as being meaningfully different, once you hit 1-A (To the degree they're incomparable, that is). The tier, as it were, is effectively based around the idea of surpassing physical differentiation and composition, to the extent where you can't be obtained by the sum of anything lesser than yourself (Contrast that with, say, something like an Inaccessible Cardinal, which can't be reached by unions of sets smaller than itself, in lesser quantities than itself, but otherwise is still the union of singletons that are individually lesser than itself)
I maintain that 1-A (Or anything below 0) is not, in fact, the lowest reasonable interpretation for Monadhood at all, so that first assertion is frankly a moot point. Really just reaffirming your stance, so, counts for nothing, really.
The entirety of this talk about Hinduism is pretty useless. Because being the substratum of existence, the Ultimate Reality, "one without a second," and etc. are not sufficient conditions for Monadhood whatsoever, even if they are necessary conditions. So you're basically presenting me with a bunch of people who deny Divine Simplicity (i e. Affirm there is no Monad at all) and then insisting they're counterexamples to my arguments.
Yeah.
As said prior, I'm more or less striving to be as secular as possible with these revisions, since the concept being posited here indeed isn't exclusively religious and finds a lot of equivalents in general philosophy and the like. Which is why I, again, stress that I'm being fairly general here: Whether a verse has a Hindu-inspired, or Buddhism-inspired or Christian-inspired view of the Monad doesn't really impact on the ratings. They're all equally welcome, since ultimately those conceptions all stick to the same basal principles at the end of the day.
Yeah, pretty much. Tier 0 is effectively the giga version of 1-A, so it naturally inherits all its disqualifiers. Being surpassed, or some such, would still allow it to keep 1-A, but if the interaction anti-feats get so damning that they're being shown as relative to the lower (i.e. non-1-A) reality, they get kicked from 1-A too.
You took the stance that the full list of qualifications doesn't need to be explicitly said of a character, because those qualities can be inferred once the being is established as a Monad through certain descriptions.
Bhaskara's view very concretely affirms Divine Simplicity, but Nimbarka's very explicitly rejects it. But Nimbarka still makes statements about the nature of Brahman which are otherwise affirmative of the rough outline of Monadhood, from which you claim DS can simply be inferred when not actually attested to. He describes Brahman as the all-pervading entity, an indivisible bliss. That all things are Brahman in their nature and essence. An omnipotent and omniscience supreme reality, from which all names and forms arise and return to. The material and efficient cause of the universe, lor od fall causes, controller of all, lord of all.
This response doesn't actually address my concern. I'll try to break it down one more time:
This idea - that both monads which can cause logically impossible things, and monads which can only cause logically possible things, actually have power over the same domain, except the latter decides to limit itself by making sure that logically impossible things are never actualised - seems like an assumption about their power which I don't think we should make without good evidence.
Your analogy is completely flawed. We're talking about characters who have nigh-identical descriptions, except one can explicitly do more things. And you're analogising that to "What if two characters had completely different descriptions, making one far weaker, except that weaker one had that addition from before?". Of course it breaks when you do that!
Not as of yet. After this thread is wrapped up, specifically, is when the more menial parts of the revisions will be sorted out (E.g. Tier 11, How to re-organize the tiers), and after that is when the standard pages will be rewritten and then presented in one final thread.
lol.
I understand ya bro, fictional characters beating up other fictional characters comes second to like, eating and breathing and life shit. In any case, I think that this idea of tier 0 absolutely has merit, and that merit certainly isn't going anywhere while you're away.
Yeah, upon further reflection, #1 indeed cannot be correct, at least not in a meaningful sense.
For the first thing: I wouldn't say that's how it is, no. It's not like logically impossible things are just desperately trying to erupt into existence and would do so if God wasn't there to "suppress" them into not existing. It's just that the Monad is the agent that determines possibility to begin with, rather than having its powers conditioned by something prior to itself. That's kind of a general result of its self-sufficiency.
The nucleus of the objection there is a valid concern, true. But it largely rests upon a misunderstanding; I would say statements of something being "All-in-One" aren't really sufficient on their own, no. What is sufficient is the general concept of distinctions between objects breaking down and being dissolved into unity as one shifts between states of reality (That's what the Cthulhu Mythos' cosmology is, as one relevant and contentious example). You'd be hard-pressed to try and fit these kinds of cosmologies with any of what you claim is a "counterexample" to this proposal's arguments.
Either Low 1-A or High 1-A+. Depends on whether their Omnipotence is defined in terms of metaphysical possibility or logical possibility.
I don't think that is what we would say, no. To take 2-A as an example: If Character A can create infinitely-many possible universes, and Character B can create infinitely-many possible universes, too, except they can't create universes where people like yellow shirts, the two characters would be exactly as powerful as each other, since the "volume" of universes that they can create is the same. The former wouldn't actually be broader than the latter in any way that matters.
