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Permission from @Just a Random Butler 
Recently there has been a divide on whether Type 1 concepts should be treated as universals or not. For example, here, here, and here. ('Universals' is not referring to the literal universe, that's a nominal misunderstanding). Many people are using an old quote from @DontTalkDT who said concepts don't need to be universals anymore in 2022. However @DontTalkDT said that Type 1 concepts specifically should be at least similar to universals in this thread. It was the same reason why Honkai CM 1 was downgraded.
The current description for CM 1 leads users to believe that it is referring to this kind of universal:
So on that note, I believe it is finally time to give this question an answer, since honestly it’ll only ever keep causing more needless debate.
To begin, personally speaking, I am very much so leaning towards the notion that CM1 should be a universal in the metaphysical sense.
Currently as it stands, CM3 is a sort-of placeholder for virtually any abstracta that can have some varying level of effect on reality. The exact borders of this ability are intentionally undefined because, as DT said above, it is a sort of catch-all type that any concept that isn’t a universal is thrown into. And this is important because these concepts work very differently to a “universal”, which I’ll just elaborate on right now:
A “universal” in metaphysics is defined as the common property a group of particulars possess. Whereas “particular” refers to a particular object possessing that property.
A good analogy for this in philosophy are the taxonomic notions of “genus” (universal) and “species” (particular). To take the genus homo for example; it becomes the common property of the species under it. I.e. homo sapien and homo erectus. (Well, more accurately, the “properties” defining homo are what is shared amongst them) Whereas each species is a sort of particular instance of the genus, only differentiated by additional properties called, well, “differentia”.
A more broad example is the kingdom of “animals”. Horses, dogs, cats are all instances of “animal”, because while different, they still share a core property or two that defines them as “animal”.
As such, we arrive at another point—universals are exemplified immanently within its particulars. As in, they are revealed by their particulars. Since, after all, the particulars are instances, or more accurately, “imitations” of it. Which is where the “participation” aspect comes about.
This is somewhat true even in an Aristotelian view even though he denied universals are real existents. (Since he affirmed genuses to be revealed by the species, even if the genus itself doesn’t exist independently, ergo exists nominally or immanently)
But what is not true there is that universals also exist transcendentally, as via one-over-many, there must be a one before it’s exemplification into multiplicity since the universal itself cannot be a particular of itself. Otherwise, we tend to head into stuff like the Third Man Argument.
And because of that does this part become true:
CM3 simply does not possess this at all. It is merely where random abstract/incorporeal objects go into that possess some vague ability. The difference between them lies in the mode of governance, wherein CM1 is more akin to a truthmaker/ground than a cause of things.
It cannot be a composite of anything either (cough energy cough), as I even brought this issue up before, since then the difference between the Types is one in quantity (in other case, pure AP) rather than in ontology (which makes it incoherent with universals). Which at that point: what’s even the point of types if you can bridge the gap by just adding up a lot of CM3 lol?
Now, there is absolutely no need to be this pretentious in the definition of the actual ability. 99% of the stuff said above has no need to be in the actual page for CM. All that we need is some form of additional clarification that includes only concepts that act similarly to a universal. Like, as I mentioned above, we should treat CM1 as a truthmaker of sorts which grounds its particulars merely by it existing.
Something I’d suggest would be akin to specifying that “particulars can exist simply because the universal exists”, or that “particulars have to be something like an imitation or shadow of the universal object in question”. Stuff like that basically, and I’ll leave it intentionally vague/open for the moderators to chime in, since it is a pretty important topic.
But really, something has to be done about this, since a lot of people think Type 1 is just Type 3 but with 3-A range.
Staff Votes:
Recently there has been a divide on whether Type 1 concepts should be treated as universals or not. For example, here, here, and here. ('Universals' is not referring to the literal universe, that's a nominal misunderstanding). Many people are using an old quote from @DontTalkDT who said concepts don't need to be universals anymore in 2022. However @DontTalkDT said that Type 1 concepts specifically should be at least similar to universals in this thread. It was the same reason why Honkai CM 1 was downgraded.
The current description for CM 1 leads users to believe that it is referring to this kind of universal:
Which, uh, as seen on the highlighted part, is the exact sort of language used in metaphysics to describe universals. Which is where all the confusion happens since if they're describing it like a universal, you'd think it actually were a universal.
So on that note, I believe it is finally time to give this question an answer, since honestly it’ll only ever keep causing more needless debate.
To begin, personally speaking, I am very much so leaning towards the notion that CM1 should be a universal in the metaphysical sense.
Currently as it stands, CM3 is a sort-of placeholder for virtually any abstracta that can have some varying level of effect on reality. The exact borders of this ability are intentionally undefined because, as DT said above, it is a sort of catch-all type that any concept that isn’t a universal is thrown into. And this is important because these concepts work very differently to a “universal”, which I’ll just elaborate on right now:
A “universal” in metaphysics is defined as the common property a group of particulars possess. Whereas “particular” refers to a particular object possessing that property.
A good analogy for this in philosophy are the taxonomic notions of “genus” (universal) and “species” (particular). To take the genus homo for example; it becomes the common property of the species under it. I.e. homo sapien and homo erectus. (Well, more accurately, the “properties” defining homo are what is shared amongst them) Whereas each species is a sort of particular instance of the genus, only differentiated by additional properties called, well, “differentia”.
A more broad example is the kingdom of “animals”. Horses, dogs, cats are all instances of “animal”, because while different, they still share a core property or two that defines them as “animal”.
As such, we arrive at another point—universals are exemplified immanently within its particulars. As in, they are revealed by their particulars. Since, after all, the particulars are instances, or more accurately, “imitations” of it. Which is where the “participation” aspect comes about.
This is somewhat true even in an Aristotelian view even though he denied universals are real existents. (Since he affirmed genuses to be revealed by the species, even if the genus itself doesn’t exist independently, ergo exists nominally or immanently)
But what is not true there is that universals also exist transcendentally, as via one-over-many, there must be a one before it’s exemplification into multiplicity since the universal itself cannot be a particular of itself. Otherwise, we tend to head into stuff like the Third Man Argument.
And because of that does this part become true:
^ Because universals do not get exhausted amongst its particulars (thus it’s effects are unlimited, i.e. “universal” in nature, as it is not a set of things that gets used up), nor are they included within them (via one-over-many). The properties they govern are simply exemplifications of it, not parts, not creations, not nothing. The kingdom of “animal” exists even without animals, because all the latter is, is just an instantiation of it. It is perfectly fine for no instances of animal to exist—that will not implicate the universal [eternal] animal.
CM3 simply does not possess this at all. It is merely where random abstract/incorporeal objects go into that possess some vague ability. The difference between them lies in the mode of governance, wherein CM1 is more akin to a truthmaker/ground than a cause of things.
It cannot be a composite of anything either (cough energy cough), as I even brought this issue up before, since then the difference between the Types is one in quantity (in other case, pure AP) rather than in ontology (which makes it incoherent with universals). Which at that point: what’s even the point of types if you can bridge the gap by just adding up a lot of CM3 lol?
Now, there is absolutely no need to be this pretentious in the definition of the actual ability. 99% of the stuff said above has no need to be in the actual page for CM. All that we need is some form of additional clarification that includes only concepts that act similarly to a universal. Like, as I mentioned above, we should treat CM1 as a truthmaker of sorts which grounds its particulars merely by it existing.
Something I’d suggest would be akin to specifying that “particulars can exist simply because the universal exists”, or that “particulars have to be something like an imitation or shadow of the universal object in question”. Stuff like that basically, and I’ll leave it intentionally vague/open for the moderators to chime in, since it is a pretty important topic.
But really, something has to be done about this, since a lot of people think Type 1 is just Type 3 but with 3-A range.
Staff Votes:
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