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Concept must necessarily be a Quiddity

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Our current standard about "what is concept" are too loose and too vague

Conceptual Manipulation is the ability to manipulate, create, and/or destroy abstract concepts. This ability has a variety of applications, ranging from not combat-applicable to incredibly dominating. Conceptual Manipulation involves the manipulation of concepts, and not the universe directly. However, through this power, one can change the universe's fundamental principles on the highest level.

Each concept is linked with its respective "object". In this way, altering the concept will change every object linked to it in the same way the concept itself was changed.
These concepts shape all of reality within their area of influence and at whatever level that area exists in, and everything in it "participates" in these concepts. For example, a circular object is circular because it is "participating" in the concept of "circle-ness". In this way, the alteration of these concepts will change every object of the concept across all of their area of influence,

Normally, we consider any unclear or poorly defined abstraction to be a concept, as long as that abstraction somehow shapes reality. The problem is that information and plot also shape reality, which means the criterion of “shaping reality” is not unique to concepts alone.

Clearly, there must be a unique “element” that distinguishes concepts from other abstractions. Information, for example, must be data or code that simulates reality. Plot, on the other hand, must carry a metafictional aspect, viewing reality as a narrative. But then the question arises what is the unique “element” for concept?


QUIDDITY (WHATNESS)
What is Quiddity? Well this is funny because we literally ask like this "what is what?". Yes Quiddity is whatness of something, what is to be the thing, or we can say the essence of thing. An intrinsic nature and core identity of something, an abstraction where the object participated in it for thus object to exist

How to get it? Well there are some criteria
  • A verse must have clear proof about whatness, a vague word like "essence" "core" "nature" doesnt count as whatness by default
  • Thus abstraction must be independent from object, it are not an accumulation of all object with same characteristic that formed a one objective term
  • Like the point above, all object are participated in thus abstraction for their existence. That mean the abstraction are the source of existence of the object
Conclusion

Add some word in the page, like this (well i think someone can describe it better)

For this ability, concept must proven to be a quiddity. Quiddity are the whatness of something, what is to be a thing. The very definition, essence, intrinsic nature, or core identity of something

Soo what about manipulating some random vague abstraction? Well i think we can make a page called abstraction manipulation, or we can put them in a page that related to them, like put abstraction of fire to fire manipulation
 
I remember there was a proposal to make a page like Essence Manipulation for ability that can manipulate essence of something that not necessary a concept
A verse must have clear proof about whatness, a vague word like "essence" "core" "nature" doesnt count as whatness by default
While i do agree with this, there is issue, there are verses that namedrop conceptual abilities such as A can destroys the concept of X, B is the concept of Z and then process to not explain further on those thing. Normally under that circumstance we put them in type 3 for explained concept or sometime type 2 in case the concept is like concept of time or space.

So what you gonna do in this situation? Based on what you proposes, likely we should remove those vague CM feat and statement like that

Thus abstraction must be independent from object, it are not an accumulation of all object with same characteristic that formed a one objective term
What do you define independent in your case?, is it independent as in the suppose concept, whatness must not tied to the object/thing that participated in said concept?


Our current standard about "what is concept" are too loose and too vague
Ngl, i don't think the problem lie in standard but how we evaluating what qualify as concept and when a feat have enough proofs to be conceptual manipulation

Should this not be a staff thread?
It should.
Moved
 
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This would definitely not apply for type 3, which is what vague abstraction usually goes into (it exists more or less for that). These additions should go into Type 2 and 1 specifically.
There is also no need for abstraction manipulation. We have our metaphysical aspects standards for that purpose, as well as Type 3 Concept Manipulation.

Introducing quiddity as a term to then use it in a single sentence is probably unnecessary.
I think the formulation "what is to be a thing" is not good, as many concepts are more definers of parts of a thing (the concept of weight is the definer of something having a weight property, but there is no thing that is weight alone). I think, along with the example currently used for concepts, it's more to the point to say they are "property givers". A concept makes all things participating in it have a property (this property could of course just be "the property to be a tree" for the concepts of trees) and all things not participating in it can't have that property.
One could also insert some wikipedia links. Type 1 concept should be things at least similar to universals. Type 2 things could for instance be the equivalence class of all tropes of the same type. (and a single trope in itself would be a type 3 concept)
 
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There are a lot of powers that naturally overlap a lot, the less specific they are, the more they can overlap, especially when it's a metaphysical thing that has no grounds on physical reality, at that point there's no certainty on what differs most of those "metaphysical things that define physical things", to the point that a lot of fictions might as well have elements that act as concepts, information, plot, all at once. It's not necessarily a problem with our pages, just the nature of how those things work (On its own, it's basically why metaphysical aspects exist for non-universals, but even then, there are bound to be exceptions with how our terminology handles it, like if a work does not differentiate universal abstract from particular, how should we tier them? It's not like there's an effective measure to abstract power that we can base on, since we can't prove existing abstracts).

I mostly agree with what DontTalk said, in fact, I thought it was something naturally assumed about the page with how it's presented, but I think it's never bad to add a bit more to it, nevertheless.
 
So what you gonna do in this situation? Based on what you proposes, likely we should remove those vague CM feat and statement like that
Just say the word concept doesnt count, even if the context is literal. I want we have a strict well defined standard about this

Well we can change the conceptual manipulation to quiddity manipulation. I think concept by it own is vague honestly

What do you define independent in your case?, is it independent as in the suppose concept, whatness must not tied to the object/thing that participated in said concept?
I mean these abstraction doesnt exist because the object is exist, but because the abstraction exist so do the object exist (not about chronological but rather a logical order)

Ngl, i don't think the problem lie in standard but how we evaluating what qualify as concept and when a feat have enough proofs to be conceptual manipulation
The standard making it happen, as it doesnt have clear meaning of concept
This would definitely not apply for type 3, which is what vague abstraction usually goes into (it exists more or less for that). These additions should go into Type 2 and 1 specifically.
There is also no need for abstraction manipulation. We have our metaphysical aspects standards for that purpose, as well as Type 3 Concept Manipulation.

Introducing quiddity as a term to then use it in a single sentence is probably unnecessary.
I think the formulation "what is to be a thing" is not good, as many concepts are more definers of parts of a thing (the concept of weight is the definer of something having a weight property, but there is no thing that is weight alone). I think, along with the example currently used for concepts, it's more to the point to say they are "property givers". A concept makes all things participating in it have a property (this property could of course just be "the property to be a tree" for the concepts of trees) and all things not participating in it can't have that property.
One could also insert some wikipedia links. Type 1 concept should be things at least similar to universals. Type 2 things could for instance be the equivalence class of all tropes of the same type. (and a single trope in itself would be a type 3 concept)
Actually no, a vague universal abstraction will go to CM 1 or 2, a vague personal abstraction will go to 3. It not about being vague or not, but being universal or personal

Well property flow from the essence, so yes it are the "property givers" after all. And i think we see the "participating" in different way, (a particular) tree participating in the concept of tree to be a tree, it was not a thing (something without core identity) participating in the concept of tree so it being a tree (gaining core identity). Concept just govern it object not a thing that have it object in it. Soo i think the formulation of "what is to be a thing" is more good than "property givers"
There are a lot of powers that naturally overlap a lot, the less specific they are, the more they can overlap, especially when it's a metaphysical thing that has no grounds on physical reality, at that point there's no certainty on what differs most of those "metaphysical things that define physical things", to the point that a lot of fictions might as well have elements that act as concepts, information, plot, all at once. It's not necessarily a problem with our pages, just the nature of how those things work (On its own, it's basically why metaphysical aspects exist for non-universals, but even then, there are bound to be exceptions with how our terminology handles it, like if a work does not differentiate universal abstract from particular, how should we tier them? It's not like there's an effective measure to abstract power that we can base on, since we can't prove existing abstracts).

I mostly agree with what DontTalk said, in fact, I thought it was something naturally assumed about the page with how it's presented, but I think it's never bad to add a bit more to it, nevertheless.
Well we can tell the different between information, causality, plot.... the thing is if there is no unique strict "element" that make them different and have their own identity we can just merge all of that
 
Just say the word concept doesnt count, even if the context is literal. I want we have a strict well defined standard about this

Well we can change the conceptual manipulation to quiddity manipulation. I think concept by it own is vague honestly
1. We have literally Type 3 Concept for any concepts that aren't well-elaborated, so your proposal also mean the removal of type 3 concept
2. A very bad practice, just because the statement wasn't elaborated further doesn't mean we should handwaving it away when the statement itself is super literal.
3. Most power is vague, not just concept, a verse could have a statement of A can manipulate cause and effects, and then process to not go too deep into its effects. Should we not index it on A's profile?

So yeah, i disagree with the thread, since it is just trying to make CM stricter for the sake of being stricter
 
1. We have literally Type 3 Concept for any concepts that aren't well-elaborated, so your proposal also mean the removal of type 3 concept
2. A very bad practice, just because the statement wasn't elaborated further doesn't mean we should handwaving it away when the statement itself is super literal.
3. Most power is vague, not just concept, a verse could have a statement of A can manipulate cause and effects, and then process to not go too deep into its effects. Should we not index it on A's profile?

So yeah, i disagree with the thread, since it is just trying to make CM stricter for the sake of being stricter
1. No, not well elaborated concept or an vague abstraction are type 2 if it was universal and type 3 if it was not
No. CM 1 for independent quiddity, CM 2 for dependent quiddity, CM 3 for personal lesser quiddity. Like how we treat our current concept

2. Well, namedroping something is always a vague case. And yeah i think concept are not the right name

3. Well if the verse literally saying manipulate the quiddity/whatness of something, that was more than enough. It very specific.
What i mean most verse doesnt consider concept as the whatness of thing soo namedroping that even in literal context are meaningless
 
Regarding Type 2, these abstract concepts are tied to the physical world.

The example they give on the information page uses "humanity," but I feel that it's dependent on the setting whether destroying literal humanity will affect the actual abstract concept of humanity.

I can't say I'm familiar with this type of example being a common thing.

IE: A setting where Humanity was eradicated thousands of years ago, but aliens still know what humans are.
 
Actually no, a vague universal abstraction will go to CM 1 or 2, a vague personal abstraction will go to 3. It not about being vague or not, but being universal or personal
Concepts that don't meet the same standards as Type 1 or Type 2, such as personal concepts that continue to govern the object in question, merely on a more specific scale, or concepts whose nature is not elaborated upon.
That "or"-clause exists for a reason.
Like, Promestein and me wrote Type 3. It has always been the purpose that if you have some "concept" you know jack about it goes into type 3. That's why it has a reminder that you need to explain what you are talking about for this type.
Well property flow from the essence, so yes it are the "property givers" after all. And i think we see the "participating" in different way, (a particular) tree participating in the concept of tree to be a tree, it was not a thing (something without core identity) participating in the concept of tree so it being a tree (gaining core identity). Concept just govern it object not a thing that have it object in it.
I don't understand what you are reasoning there. Like, is your point whether or not something remains of a thing after you remove a concept from it or something?
Soo i think the formulation of "what is to be a thing" is more good than "property givers"
"what is to be a thing" is a question, not an answer.
And ultimately it's just vaguer, because you get caught up in things like nominalism there. What makes something a thing is philosophically answered in many different ways not all of which we would consider concepts.
A "property giver" just seems like a more clean definition, as it is clear what it does. It establishes a causal relationship of a kind.
 
That "or"-clause exists for a reason.
Like, Promestein and me wrote Type 3. It has always been the purpose that if you have some "concept" you know jack about it goes into type 3. That's why it has a reminder that you need to explain what you are talking about for this type.
Yeah the thing is we literally give some vague abstraction to type 2 or 1 as long as it was universal
I don't understand what you are reasoning there. Like, is your point whether or not something remains of a thing after you remove a concept from it or something?
Well not entirely catch my point. I mean is concept just tied/govern a thing they related to, like concept of tree is just govern a tree, concept of weight just govern a weight, well it was hard if what the concept govern is not an substance to begin with. A concept must be the very core of identity that give existence to what it govern, soo yeah the concept of weight making all weight have their existence (well making the weight it self an substance or a object not just some measurement)

"what is to be a thing" is a question, not an answer.
And ultimately it's just vaguer, because you get caught up in things like nominalism there. What makes something a thing is philosophically answered in many different ways not all of which we would consider concepts.
A "property giver" just seems like a more clean definition, as it is clear what it does. It establishes a causal relationship of a kind.
It was a question if you see the "what" in there in conversational context. Well if you search "whatness" or "quiddity", just one description that will appear, basically there was no other way to describe that. And well it can describe as "abstraction that making a thing is a thing" or something like that

I dont really matter what you would name it, as long as this "property giver" are the very definition of thing, it fine. My problem basically if it was just a giver of property, not a form a archetype of something that making a thing is a thing
 
I was given permission by Ant to comment here.

Normally, we consider any unclear or poorly defined abstraction to be a concept, as long as that abstraction somehow shapes reality. The problem is that information and plot also shape reality, which means the criterion of “shaping reality” is not unique to concepts alone.
A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.

The concept manipulation page is wearing several hats. It doesn't only covers concepts, which in reality are just ideas. But it also covers other philosophical "concepts" such as platonic forms, universals, essences, etc. which are not explicitly ideas

This wiki could very well narrow concept manipulation to being just "ideas" but you would be leaving a a giant void for the things i mentioned earlier. Those things would have to be equalized within concept manipulation or a new ability would have to be made for them.

What is Quiddity? Well this is funny because we literally ask like this "what is what?". Yes Quiddity is whatness of something, what is to be the thing, or we can say the essence of thing. An intrinsic nature and core identity of something, an abstraction where the object participated in it for thus object to exist

This suggestion wouldn't solve the problem that you're trying to solve, as information type 2 can also fall into this category as well. The only thing that would make concepts distinct from other metaphysical aspects, would be to narrow them to ideas which I've explained makes more problems than solves.
 
I think it's generally a bad idea to tie our increasingly complicated pages and standards to specific philosophical terms.

Not only does it make it more confusing for people, but we should be at least somewhat open to the idea that a particular fiction may establish what is essentially the same thing but in entirely different terms.
 
Which staff members think that we should do what here? 🙏
 
Seems like most staff are insisting on not accepting this as it makes things far too complicated.
 
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