Modal Realism and Type 4 Multiverse

[Abu2411]

Hey everyone,

I was wondering what the tiers of a cosmology which operates on modal realism, extended modal realism and a type 4 multiverse would be?

As a bonus question, are there any cosmologies that are higher than even these? If so, what are they?

 

[Planck69]

As far as I'm aware, a Type 4 multiverse depends on how well elaborated it is in the work of fiction in question (since taken at face value, it would be Tier 0).

 

[Guardian_Doge]

I was wondering what the tiers of a cosmology which operates on modal realism, extended modal realism and a type 4 multiverse would be?

Modal Realism and a Type 4 are essentially same overall concept just proposed much differently. The MUH (Mathematical universe hypothesis) states every possibility, mathematical structures, metaphysical ideas--are physical, existent in reality somewhere.

Modal realism's idea is "the actual world is one of an infinite set of logically possible worlds" and logically possible is meant to reflect the abstraction of logical models that assert consistency and thus don't break themselves.

So given this idea, let's establish a few things about EMR:

• Extended Modal realism is the idea impossible worlds exists
• Impossible worlds are the proposition that an illogical world has a place in reality like its logical counterpart.
• Illogical means that it does not work within the laws of logic or similar operations that induce consistency (i.e a world where the law of identity cannot define it)

However it is also stated by Graham Priest, an impossible world does not inherently have higher ontological value than a possible one.

As far as I can see, any of the main theories concerning the nature of possible worlds can be applied equally to impossible worlds: they are existent nonactual entities; they are nonexistent objects; they are constructions out of properties and other universals; they are just certain sets of sentences. … There is, as far as I can see, absolutely no cogent (in particular, non-question-begging) reason to suppose that there is an ontological difference between merely possible and impossible worlds.
(Priest 1997b: 580–1)

Though he does say they are just sets of sentences, just replicate the idea of ontology from a realist point of view kek.

To explain the idea of impossible more, let's take another quote:

Priest (2016) adopts two principles that are similar to, but stronger than, (NP): ‘everything holds at some worlds, and everything fails at some worlds’ (Priest 2016, 5) and, for any distinct AA, BB, ‘there are worlds where AA holds and BB fails’ (Priest 2016, 7). More specifically, in our terminology:

• (4.1) For any AA, there is a world which represents that AA and a world which does not represent that AA.
• (4.2) For any distinct AA and BB, there is a world which represents that AA but does not represent that BB.

Priest calls these the ‘primary directive’ and ‘secondary directive’ on impossible worlds, respectively. The latter implies the former, which in turn implies (NP), but neither converse holds.

To illustrate the extra power (4.2) gives us (over (4.1) and (NP)), consider Simplification, the inference from A∧BA∧B to AA, or Disjunction Introduction, from AA to A∨BA∨B. (4.2) directly entails that there are worlds where these rules fail. So, if we find (4.2) plausible, we can infer that impossible worlds are not, in general, governed by standard paraconsistent logics. A paraconsistent logic is any one in which contradictory premises AA, ¬A¬A do not entail arbitrary conclusions. But standardly, paraconsistent logics maintain the principle that conjunctions are true just in case both conjuncts are; disjunctions are true just in case at least one disjunct is; and double negations ¬¬A¬¬A are true just in case AA is. If we accept (4.2), then these relationships will break down in some impossible worlds.

So they are "illogical" in the philosophical sense that our logical models, such as paraconsistency (something a wave function or Schrödinger's cat reflects) can break down in one these worlds.
In all honesty this is such a broad topic I need to study.

---

Anyhow, now that I've given you a basis for these three ideas. When we take a look at it's tiering it's kind of undefined. So in this wiki, like planck said, we take a look at the interpretation given inside the verse, and then extend the idea to whatever level it may propose.

Outside of this wiki, both MR and MUH, are any probable idea you can think of regarding transcendence. Effectively, EMR cannot be tiered coherently. I hope I answered your question (._. Probably didn't)

(Edit: for your second question, no not really.)

 

[Savior]

Modal Realism and a Type 4 are essentially same overall concept just proposed much differently. The MUH (Mathematical universe hypothesis) states every possibility, mathematical structures, metaphysical ideas--are physical, existent in reality somewhere.

Modal realism's idea is "the actual world is one of an infinite set of logically possible worlds" and logically possible is meant to reflect the abstraction of logical models that assert consistency and thus don't break themselves.

So given this idea, let's establish a few things about EMR:

• Extended Modal realism is the idea impossible worlds exists
• Impossible worlds are the proposition that an illogical world has a place in reality like its logical counterpart.
• Illogical means that it does not work within the laws of logic or similar operations that induce consistency (i.e a world where the law of identity cannot define it)

However it is also stated by Graham Priest, an impossible world does not inherently have higher ontological value than a possible one.

Though he does say they are just sets of sentences, just replicate the idea of ontology from a realist point of view kek.

To explain the idea of impossible more, let's take another quote:

So they are "illogical" in the philosophical sense that our logical models, such as paraconsistency (something a wave function or Schrödinger's cat reflects) can break down in one these worlds.
In all honesty this is such a broad topic I need to study.

---

Anyhow, now that I've given you a basis for these three ideas. When we take a look at it's tiering it's kind of undefined. So in this wiki, like planck said, we take a look at the interpretation given inside the verse, and then extend the idea to whatever level it may propose.

Outside of this wiki, both MR and MUH, are any probable idea you can think of regarding transcendence. Effectively, EMR cannot be tiered coherently. I hope I answered your question (._. Probably didn't)

(Edit: for your second question, no not really.

Where would Modal Realism scale?

 

[Cat275]

Where would Modal Realism scale?

L-1A by default because of real coordinate space if im not wrong.

 

[Ayano_]

It depends on how good the explanation of these two concepts is.

Pretty sure that type IV is low 1-A if taken at face value, but of course, if explained better, much higher.



The same thing can be applied to modal realism. At face value, VSBW takes it as multiversal+(Although imo it should too be low 1-A) But with good explanation much higher.

But modal realism in scaling is always a bit tricky tbh