Is logic manipulation inferior or equal to Concept/Information/Plot?

[Thermor]

By default.

 

[AyOgUyS]

I mean...isn't logic a concept? and information can be a concept as well, and so is plot if you think abt it

concept MANIP might just be the strongest power

 

[AlipheeseXIV]

Isn't this already answered by the logic manip page? The default is that it can only do explicitly what it has been shown doing, varying from fiction to fiction

 

[AlexSamDen]

Our Metaphysical Aspects page already addresses this question. There is no inherent superiority between them

 

[Thermor]

Our Metaphysical Aspects page already addresses this question. There is no inherent superiority between them

It did said that laws are often inferior than concepts. So I was wondering if logic is treated similar to laws in terms of hierarchy.

 

[AlexSamDen]

It did said that laws are often inferior than concepts. So I was wondering if logic is treated similar to laws in terms of hierarchy.

It was said as an example of such an order being applied in fiction, it in no way reflects our standards
So, technically, Logic is treated the same as Laws. They're just both equal to everything else unless stated otherwise

 

[FriendOfTheTeaParty]

certain High 1-A+ characters focused around creating effects are able to use every metaphysical aspect even though they're manifesting possibilities that are rooted in logic btw so the wiki kinda treats logic as inherently above everything else but the type of logic used for logic manip and such is fake logic

 

[TheGreatJedi13]

ChatGPT brings up the Prior to metaphysics statement

Eitherway its only above at least Law Hax and Causality hax as stated in the page
But that depends on the scale to which logic hax is

Rather, they are the basis for any and all laws, calculation, and relations between phenomena.

So likely not above concept, info, or plot

 

[SuperNova55555]

I mean...isn't logic a concept?

Definitely not. It would be an ontic category error if anything

 

[AyOgUyS]

Definitely not. It would be an ontic category error if anything

Eh ok I don’t really know enough to say

 

[SuperNova55555]

Eh ok I don’t really know enough to say

Unless you speak of logic nominalistically, then you would have to assume that logic is a property or quality that a being can have.

If it were part of something’s substance or essence, then any certain being that isn’t actualized does not “have logic”; so you’d be claiming all non-existents break the laws of thought. Which is rather absurd. And loads and loads of other bs

 

[Fixxed]

From what DT say

Laws and concepts also has nothing to do with logic. Logic is prior to metaphysics.

And from the page itself

Rather, they are the basis for any and all laws, calculation, and relations between phenomena.

logic is likely superior to metaphysics it self, and it was more basic or fundamental than those. Well thats make sense because everything need logic for their existence and meaning, and logic doesnt need anything, it was a self-sufficient thing

 

[SuperNova55555]

From what DT say

And from the page itself


logic is likely superior to metaphysics it self, and it was more basic or fundamental than those. Well thats make sense because everything need logic for their existence and meaning, and logic doesnt need anything, it was a self-sufficient thing

I personally heavily disagree with DT. “Logic is prior to metaphysics” is genuinely an insane take lol

 

[DontTalkDT]

2.1 Validity defined more carefully​

(a)
We said in §1.3 that an inference step is deductively valid if it is completely watertight – in other words, assuming that the inference’s premisses are true, its conclusion is absolutely guaranteed to be true as well.

But talk of an inference being “watertight” and talk of a conclusion being “guaranteed” to be true is too metaphorical for comfort. So – now dropping the explicit “deductively” – here is a less metaphorical definition, already hinted at:

An inference step is valid if and only if there is no possible situation in which its premisses would be true and its conclusion false.
Equivalently, in such a case, we will say that the inference’s premisses entail its conclusion.

Take the plural “premisses”, here and in similar statements, to cover the one-premiss case too. Then this definition characterizes what is often called the classical concept of validity. It is, however, only as clear as the notion of a “possible situation”. So we certainly need to pause over this.

---

(b)
Consider the following bit of reasoning:

A
Jo jumped out of a twentieth floor window (without parachute, safety net, etc.) and fell unimpeded onto a concrete pavement.
So she was injured.

Let’s grant that, with the laws of nature as they are, there is no way in which the premiss could be true and the conclusion false (assume that we are talking about here on Earth, that Jo is a human, not a beetle, etc.). In the actual world, falling unimpeded onto concrete from twenty floors up will always produce serious – very probably fatal – injury. Does that make the inference from A’s premiss to its conclusion valid?

No. It isn’t, let’s agree, physically possible in our actual circumstances to jump without being injured. But we can coherently, without self-contradiction, conceive of a situation in which the laws of nature are different or are miraculously suspended, and someone jumping from twenty floors up can float delicately down like a feather. We can imagine a capricious deity bringing about such a situation. In this very weak sense, it is possible that A’s premiss could be true while its conclusion is false. And that is enough for the inference to be deductively invalid.

---

(c)
So our definition of validity is to be read like this: a deductively valid inference is one where it is not possible even in the most generously inclusive sense – roughly, it is not even coherently conceivable – that the inference’s premisses are true and its conclusion false.

Let’s elaborate. We ordinarily talk of many different kinds of possibility – about what is physically possible (given the laws of nature), what is technologically possible (given our engineering skills), what is politically possible (given the make-up of the electorate), what is financially possible (given the state of your bank balance), and so on. These different kinds of possibility are related in various ways. For example, something that is technologically possible has to be physically possible, but may not be financially possible for anyone to engineer.

But note that if some situation is M-ly possible (for any suitable modifier “M”), then, at the very least, a description of that situation has to be internally coherent. In other words, if some situation is M-ly possible, then it must be possible in the thin sense that the very idea of such a situation occurring isn’t ruled out as nonsense. The notion of possibility we need in defining validity is possibility in this weakest, most inclusive sense. And from now on, when we talk in an unqualified way about possibility, it is this very weak sense that we will have in mind.

---

(d)
Kinds of possibility go together with matching kinds of necessity – “necessary” means “not-possibly-not”. For example, it is legally necessary for an enforceable will to be signed if and only if it is not legally possible for a will to be enforceable yet not signed. It is physically necessary that massive objects gravitationally attract each other if and only if it is not physically possible that those objects not attract each other. And so on. Generalizing, we can massage such equivalences into the standard form:

It is M-ly necessary that C if and only if it is not M-ly possible that not-C,

where “C” stands in for some statement, and “not-C” stands in for the denial of that statement.

Likewise, our very weak inclusive notion of possibility goes with a correspondingly strong notion of necessity: it is necessary that C in this sense just in case it is not even weakly possible that not-C. Putting it another way:

It is necessarily true that C if and only if it is true that C in every possible situation, in our most inclusive sense of “possible”.

From now on, when we talk in an unqualified way about necessity, it is this very strong sense that we will have in mind.

And yes, being necessarily true is a very strong requirement, as strong as can be. However, it is one that can be met in some cases. For example, it is necessary in this sense that Jill is not both married and unmarried (at the same time, in the same jurisdiction). It is necessary in our strong sense that all triangles have three sides (in any coherently conceivable situation, the straight-sided figures with three internal angles are three-sided). Again, it is necessary that whenever a mother smiles, a parent smiles.

It is equally necessary that if all philosophers are eccentric and Jack is a philosopher, then Jack is eccentric. And this last example illustrates a general point, which gives us an equivalent definition of deductive validity:

An inference step is valid if and only if it is necessary, in the strongest sense, that if the inference’s premisses are true, so is its conclusion.
For short, valid inferences are necessarily truth-preserving.

An introduction to formal logic by Peter Smith

The case of laws of nature is already covered and for platonic concepts just set M = "platonic". Talking about what is possible in a world of platonic concepts is talking about what is platonically possible and being logically possible is more inclusive by definition. Meanwhile, talking about what is necessarily true in a world of platonic concepts, is then by definition less exclusive than talking about what is logically necessary.
In other words, I can coherently conceive a world in which platonic concepts aren't a thing, because nominalism or trope theory are true instead. So those metaphysics are not absolutes in the realm of logic.

Given, as usual fiction can do whatever the hell it wants, so no absolutes there. Hence also no defaults.

 

[FriendOfTheTeaParty]

In other words, I can coherently conceive a world in which platonic concepts aren't a thing, because nominalism or trope theory are true instead. So those metaphysics are not absolutes in the realm of logic.

Wouldn't those stuff just... be asserted as a logical impossibility if you assume platonism is fully true as plato intended?

 

[FriendOfTheTeaParty]

Wouldn't those stuff just... be asserted as a logical impossibility if you assume platonism is fully true as plato intended?

Because to a platonist they would just reject a universal-less world, and that any sort of logical discussion inherently uses universals/forms since they're what's behind intelligibility itself. A world without universals here would be only logical on a very surface level, but actually be logically impossible because for an intelligible thing to exist it must have an intelligible form. Otherwise to a platonist you're essentially saying reality is some unintelligible blob.

 

[SuperNova55555]

Wouldn't those stuff just... be asserted as a logical impossibility if you assume platonism is fully true as plato intended?

Uh, this is why I should go backwards and read more normal Plato stuff, but from my knowledge this would be the case, yea.

This is even more explicit for Neoplatonism as well, since Forms in this view as well are the pre-condition for intelligibility. In fact, you can go as far as to say that this extends even to Soul as discursive reasoning is completely delimited at that level. I guess you could say that both Intellect and Soul are contenders for T0 so they hold some arbitrary wiki-assigned position as “above logic” but this argument fails for basic Forms nevertheless.

Also:

An introduction to formal logic by Peter Smith

The case of laws of nature is already covered and for platonic concepts just set M = "platonic". Talking about what is possible in a world of platonic concepts is talking about what is platonically possible and being logically possible is more inclusive by definition. Meanwhile, talking about what is necessarily true in a world of platonic concepts, is then by definition less exclusive than talking about what is logically necessary.
In other words, I can coherently conceive a world in which platonic concepts aren't a thing, because nominalism or trope theory are true instead. So those metaphysics are not absolutes in the realm of logic.

Given, as usual fiction can do whatever the hell it wants, so no absolutes there. Hence also no defaults.

You’re conflating conceivability for metaphysical necessity.

 

[DontTalkDT]

You’re conflating conceivability for metaphysical necessity.

I didn't say anything involving necessity and conceivability.

Unless you mean the book content I quoted, in which case I'm sure the Cambridge professor who wrote it finds your comment enlightening.

Wouldn't those stuff just... be asserted as a logical impossibility if you assume platonism is fully true as plato intended?

"If you assumed the law of universal gravitation is true, wouldn't that mean that it's logically impossible for two things with mass not to attract each other."
Basically the same question. The answer is yes, because it's a valid inference. But that doesn't mean platonism restraints logic anymore than it means physics constraints logic.

Because to a platonist they would just reject a universal-less world, and that any sort of logical discussion inherently uses universals/forms since they're what's behind intelligibility itself. Thus making a world without universals be only logical on a surface level, but be logically impossible because for an intelligible thing to exist it must have an intelligible form. Otherwise to a platonist you're essentially saying reality is some unintelligible blob.

All of that hinges on the assumption that a platonist can not coherently conceive a world in which intelligibility is not tied to universals. However, exeprience-wise even platoists can actually do so.
Their not believing in different metaphysical systems doesn't mean they can't conceive of them.

Given, as SuperNova's cryptic comment to me was perhaps meant to hint at, conceivability is, as the book put it just "roughly" the criteria we are looking for. (As much as one can debate about the meaningfulness of inconceivable options) I would strictly only call coherent conceivability a sufficient criteria for possibility.

The definition as the book gives it, which should be used if one is wishes to get very pedantic about it, is that logically possible means possible in the weakest, most inclusive sense. If it's M-ly possible for any M, then it's logically possible.
Notice how you hence can not restrict this to a platonic view. Because you can also ask whether a situation is possible from a trope-theorists view. It being "trope-ly possible" is also a kind of possible and anything that is "trope-ly possible" is logically possible.

 

[Ultima_Reality]

By default.

There isn't really a default because there are many ways of understanding the abilities involved. Depending on the verse's particular metaphysics, "Conceptual Manipulation" could encompass Logic Manipulation, for instance.

The case of laws of nature is already covered and for platonic concepts just set M = "platonic". Talking about what is possible in a world of platonic concepts is talking about what is platonically possible and being logically possible is more inclusive by definition. Meanwhile, talking about what is necessarily true in a world of platonic concepts, is then by definition less exclusive than talking about what is logically necessary.
In other words, I can coherently conceive a world in which platonic concepts aren't a thing, because nominalism or trope theory are true instead. So those metaphysics are not absolutes in the realm of logic.

Unless the priority you're talking about is purely an epistemic one (i.e. It's a priority in our thinking, not in reality as such), saying logic is an absolute just ends up being a species of mathematical platonism, ironically enough (In this case, one about logic and its laws).

 

[FriendOfTheTeaParty]

All of that hinges on the assumption that a platonist can not coherently conceive a world in which intelligibility is not tied to universals. However, exeprience-wise even platoists can actually do so.
Their not believing in different metaphysical systems doesn't mean they can't conceive of them.

You can conceive that a married bachelor is a contradiction but that doesn't make the contents of "married bachelor" any more coherent. This is essentially how a platonist would view stuff without universals. Logic in any fashion whatsoever would inherently entail universals to them.

I'm just saying that some stuff is inherently incompatible. You cant take whole and pure platonism and assert it exists in a possible world without running into an irreconcilable contradiction with the philosophy itself.

 

[ItsMeat]

The 3 laws of thought>>>

Everything depends on the scope, we usually assume the metaphysical aspects to be equal although fiction can just show them overriding each other however the author wants. For example you can go to infinity in the cycle of: "I manipulate the Concept of your Fundamental Information" vs "I manipulate the Fundamental Information of your Concept"

 

[SuperNova55555]

I didn't say anything involving necessity and conceivability.

You don’t need to because it is implied by virtue of you attempting to delimit the existence of Forms through conceivability, which as I mentioned in my first comment in this thread is an ontic category error.

Logic is fundamentally a discursive and descriptive tool; and discourse is explicitly posterior to intelligible principles. So stuff like “X is Y and not Z”, contrary to your belief, does not actually apply to things of this level. In fact, Forms shouldn’t even share univocal relations with what they ground at all.

So you saying that Forms are below logic because it can describe of worlds that do not contain Forms is just a null point, because the necessity of Forms is not a modal thing, which your earlier point presumes.

 

[Ultima_Reality]

Logic is fundamentally a discursive and descriptive tool; and discourse is explicitly posterior to intelligible principles. So stuff like “X is Y and not Z”, contrary to your belief, does not actually apply to things of this level.

Awh, I wouldn't go that far. In classical Platonism, e.g., Sameness and Otherness are both Forms and they, so to speak, administer the relationships between the other Forms under their purview, so you can say that "Horse-itself is not Man-itself" and so on. What fails to obtain at the intelligible level is discursive rationalizing where we move from premise to conclusion, as, for instance, when one argues: "Man is an animal. Ultima is a man. Therefore, Ultima is an animal." Operating at the "intellectual" level would entail not going through that process and instead just knowing all of this immediately, but it's not an abolishing of identity and difference altogether.

Really the clinch here is this: OP is talking about the manipulation of things, which is already assuming that we're not talking about things simply epistemically (i.e. As relating merely to how we come to know stuff) but as actually relating to reality. Now, either the priority of "logic" over other things is merely epistemic, or it isn't. If it is, then what DontTalk is saying is ultimately vacuous and doesn't mean anything as far as the question asked by OP is concerned. If it isn't, and instead logical laws (e.g. "A = A," "A ≠ ~A," "P v ~P") are actual binds on reality itself, then what he says more or less defeats itself because the positing of such binding world-patterns is itself a species of what he's trying to relativize (It's a form of mathematical platonism as said), in which case it's not really true that logic is prior to these things, rather it's a case of those things. i.e. You can conceive of Conceptual Manipulation as including Logic Manipulation, ditto for Information Manipulation, and you can also conceive of Logic Manipulation including those two, and the same goes for Information Manipulation.

So it goes back to the answer that there is no true default; all these abilities can and do interpenetrate each other with no real traceable priority. (And there's ofc the fact fiction does what it wants and we ourselves entertain several different views within a certain range)

 

[SuperNova55555]

Awh, I wouldn't go that far. In classical Platonism, e.g., Sameness and Otherness are both Forms and they, so to speak, administer the relationships between the other Forms under their purview, so you can say that "Horse-itself is not Man-itself" and so on. What fails to obtain at the intelligible level is discursive rationalizing where we move from premise to conclusion, as, for instance, when one argues: "Man is an animal. Ultima is a man. Therefore, Ultima is an animal." Operating at the "intellectual" level would entail not going through that process and instead just knowing all of this immediately, but it's not an abolishing of identity and difference altogether.

Yeaaa, that’s on me. I worded it pretty badly.

 

[AyOgUyS]

Unless you speak of logic nominalistically, then you would have to assume that logic is a property or quality that a being can have.

If it were part of something’s substance or essence, then any certain being that isn’t actualized does not “have logic”; so you’d be claiming all non-existents break the laws of thought. Which is rather absurd. And loads and loads of other bs

idk man I'm not an expert on this stuff

 

[BeTheWay1rst]

I can coherently conceive a world in which platonic concepts aren't a thing

Now, try doing it in a world where informations aren't a thing

 

[Thermor]

Now, try doing it in a world where informations aren't a thing

What about in a world where matter dont exist? Everything is NEP.

 

[BeTheWay1rst]

What about in a world where matter dont exist?

Dream/Imagination ?

 

[FriendOfTheTeaParty]

What about in a world where matter dont exist? Everything is NEP.

Jake’s vision became a flood wave of colors as he felt himself being torn in all directions at once. It was as if the space energy was trying to atomize him, though he was pretty sure atoms weren’t really a thing anymore. In either case, a B-grade was simply too naturally durable to find itself torn apart by what Jake was going through, and he even found time to ponder what was happening.

To summarise: the statues depicted a bunch of weaker gods or subordinate gods from larger organizations. Nothing interesting or fancy going on at all. Of course, to the populace of Haven, any god was an absolutely insurmountable existence. It kind of made sense. To a regular human. It didn’t matter if a black hole was small or large; it could rip you apart atom by atom no matter what. If atoms were still a thing after the system. Probably not. Did black holes still exist? Probably. Jake couldn’t wait to go see one. Event horizons looked dope in pictures, and seeing one in person would be awesome.