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If we stick to classical logic, the principle of explosion proves us that every conclusion starting with such a paradoxical premise is valid. Therefore, we don't get it's stronger or weaker or anything. Of course, I absolutely do not intend to accept a burden of proof on them being not-stronger.Even if we stick to classical logic, that doesn't tell us that such paradoxical things are weaker, it only tells us that such things are impossible (or in other words, are paradoxical; or in other words, collapse under the principle of explosion).
But if we defer that explosion to the fictional world where such things are asserted as true, I think we can still say from outside of it that being able to perform those things represents more capabilities, and so can reasonably be described as "stronger".
You speak of defering explosion, but that only works if you restrict yourself to reasoning steps which don't have contradictions as their premise. That they even have more capabilities, or that those are relevant, is not given without such premises.
Furthermore, I remind that a monads standing is currently justified by not being many things. If you take the possibility of a monad being partially in paraconsitent states into account, the reasoning for their standing crumbles. A monad without qualities can't be restrained to a lesser reality, but can a monad with qualities in a third truth value?
Consider that our monads are currently actually restricted from doing many things other characters can. They aren't entities defined by their ability to do whatever they like in whichever state they desire. So that adding more possibilities is inherently good isn't a given at all. To return to my initial point, to be able to do more may as well include possibilities detrimental to you. Is a monad that can paradoxically permanently die stronger than a regular logically consistent monad just due to that extra possibility? Not really.
Given, overall we would need a more solid system to even debate this properly in my opinion. I can see how "defering explosion" by just excluding paradoxes from the premise of any argument is not a satisfying standpoint. Simultaneously, just cherry picking any conclusion we wish from the paradoxical pool, while discarding anything paradoxical which doesn't fit our preconceived notions outright, is unjustified.
So I would like to propose that we adopt this as our standard for analyzing paradoxical matters in literature. That's still plenty case-by-case, but having at least some foundation would really help IMO.