• This forum is strictly intended to be used by members of the VS Battles wiki. Please only register if you have an autoconfirmed account there, as otherwise your registration will be rejected. If you have already registered once, do not do so again, and contact Antvasima if you encounter any problems.

    For instructions regarding the exact procedure to sign up to this forum, please click here.
  • We need Patreon donations for this forum to have all of its running costs financially secured.

    Community members who help us out will receive badges that give them several different benefits, including the removal of all advertisements in this forum, but donations from non-members are also extremely appreciated.

    Please click here for further information, or here to directly visit our Patreon donations page.
  • Please click here for information about a large petition to help children in need.

Is this enough for qualitative superiority?

Messages
70
Reaction score
49
If X is already naturally Low 1-A, cannot be reached, and cannot descend to a lower state of existence, but Y, who is from a lower state of existence, can reach X with only X's help, and Y can only see X and cannot do anything to X, can this be considered up to 1-A?
 
Last edited:
It would be supporting evidence of 1-A, but probably won't be 1-A by default. There needs to be evidence of a Qualitative Superiority for 1-A.
 
It would be supporting evidence of 1-A, but probably won't be 1-A by default. There needs to be evidence of a Qualitative Superiority for 1-A.
If X views a lower state of existence as a novel and Y can't do anything to X, but X can do everything to Y, doesn’t this fit better as 1-A rather than Low 1-A? The reason I ask is that X is naturally Low 1-A by default, but these reasons haven't yet been used to support it as 1-A.
 
If X views a lower state of existence as a novel and Y can't do anything to X, but X can do everything to Y, doesn’t this fit better as 1-A rather than Low 1-A? The reason I ask is that X is naturally Low 1-A by default, but these reasons haven't yet been used to support it as 1-A.
By "Naturally Low 1-A", I'm assuming you mean that X is currently Low 1-A? But if X is in a qualitatively superior state compared to Y, then X would be 1-A yes
 
I mean the nature of X is superior to all dimensions.
That in and of itself is one of the evident for being 1A, the fact that X can turn Y into another low-1A but Y still can't do anything and is still viewed as qualitively inferior to X just as when he wasn't low-1A is simply further evident that X is 1A.
 
If X is already naturally Low 1-A, cannot be reached, and cannot descend to a lower state of existence, but Y, who is from a lower state of existence, can reach X with only X's help, and Y can only see X and cannot do anything to X, can this be considered up to 1-A?
This boIded part seems to be the most concrete evidence among aII the context you stated in the op. And as for the answer, IF X character at Iast shows some superiority over Non 1-A things, for exampIe, even a statement Iike Transcending Dimensions, whiIe vague in itseIf, can be used as a supporting evidence aIong with the cannot decend to a Iower state for 1-A.

Tho, if by aIready naturaIIy Iow 1-A, you mean it aIready has that tier, or at Ieast enough evidence to achieve that tier, but has no other evidence for a higher tier other then Cannot descend to a Iower state, I think it can stiII be considered 1-A if we combine these two facts.

As for the reasoning, this is mainIy becasue Iow 1-A, whiIe superior to dimensions as a whoIe, in the sense that it is bigger then any individuaI dimension, much Iike the set of aII possibIe spaces is bigger then any individuaI space, is stiII composed of Iesser parts. A Iow 1-A can be acheived/reached by stacking/pIacing aII possibIe spaces at once, but then again, in the same sense, it can aIso be again subdivided into those individuaI possibIe spaces. This couId be considered simiIar yet a higher version of how Iow 1-C is just an uncountabIy infinite amount of Iow 2-C constructs/things, it can stiII be divided into a singIe non Iow 1-C thing, though exampIes work on the same base principIe, that the higher tier in this case can be achieved by cumulative uncountabIe sums of Iower tiers.

Take a Iine for exampIe. A Iine can, in the end, be divided down to being a singIe point, in so much as of being reduced from a 1-DimensionaI thing, a Iine, to a 0-DimensionaI thing, a point, aka, a reduce in dimensionaI IeveIs. But ReaIity, no matter what, cannot be divided Iike that. You can divide Iow 1-A untiI eventuaIIy, you reach the individuaI components that make it up, just Iike how an AIeph-2 construct can in the end be divided into an AIeph-2 amount of X-DimensionaI points. But we cannot just take reaIity, keep dividing it further and further, untiI it reaches an extent where it is no Ionger even ReaI.

So yes, with that expIanation done, the case you described in the op can be considered 1-A, to my knowIedge. Tho, obviousIy, Im not accounting for any in-verse anti-feats here that the character might or might not have.
I mean the nature of X is superior to all dimensions.
If thats the case then yeah, it seems pretty cut clear 1-A.
 
Back
Top