Extended Modal Realism?

[Megaraptor149]

This is example of Extended Modal Realism?

Normally, when someone says trust me, I find it hard to trust him anymore, and this is doubly true for when it is my self who is saying it, but as it turns out, in my science fictional studies, I once took a course on the topological properties of possibility space and in chapter three of the coursebook we had covered this very scenario as a case study in this:

Exceedingly Improbable yet Hypothetically Still Possible States of Affairs in a Coherent Universe Governed by a Consistent Set of Fictional Laws

and in fact, for a while I even considered writing my thesis on a minor but novel approach to proving, with only ZF+CH (Zermelo-Frankel set theory plus the Continuum Hypothesis), that this exact fact pattern, the one happening to me right that moment, was in fact (i) grammatically allowed, (ii) logically permitted, and (iii) metaphysically possible. And of course, my future self would know all of this, and he would know that I would know that he would know this, and that’s why he knew it would be worth it to give me this book. And so he’s written, in his handwriting, handwriting I recognize as my very own, these words:

Read this book. Then write it. Your life depends on it.

 

[Megaraptor149]

The text from the novel describes a scenario that can be classified as “Exceedingly Improbable yet Hypothetically Still Possible States of Affairs in a Coherent Universe Governed by a Consistent Set of Fictional Laws.” This may refer to the idea of a structured possibility space with topological properties, and even to the notion that such a framework can be formally proven as a logical and metaphysical possibility by using set theory.

The novel’s text also implies treating all logically consistent possibilities, including highly improbable ones, as valid states within a structured possibility space. It also allows for an internally consistent set of fictional laws with non-standard causal structures, as long as they do not lead to contradictions.

This seems similar to an interpretation of Extended Modal Realism, where even logically possible worlds, including highly abstract or non-physical ones, are treated as equally valid within a broader ontological framework.

Or is there something I'm missing?